84 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
84 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
---
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title: >-
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Bitcoin mixer.
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sidebar: false
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notmine: false
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abstract: >-
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I want to get early adopters to use my planned privacy
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social net, as a small step to replacing SWIFT.
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all existing bitcoin mixers have been shut down because
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they relied on a centralized social net,
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which depended on domain names, which resulted
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in the fbi arriving at address of the owner of the
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domain name
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---
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Samourai wallet migrated to centralisation, which directly led to them getting
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busted. That codebase is poisoned with communications that the FBI
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has flagged as actionable. And integrating anything into current
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Bitmessage is impossible except for the original developer. No
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big Python program is truly open source.
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The correct design for a mixer is as follows. One has a social net,
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on which anyone can offer to coordinate a single mixing transaction.
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for a mix that will produce mixed coins (utxos )of a particular
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round number, 10mBTC, 20mBTC, 50mBTC, or 100mBTC,
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plus unmixed changed coins.
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All the mixed coins are of equal value, for example all 100mBTC.
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Not some funny value highly identifiable value like 99.9872384mBTC
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People offer to contribute utxos to this mix transaction - revealing
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to the coordinater the public keys, the address, of the utxos,and
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revealing to the coordinator that these utxos have a common owner.
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They also give him the blinded addresses of coins they want to
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receive. He blindsigns those addresses. They then reveal the unblinded
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addresses, and his unblinded signature, which proves he signed those
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addresses, but does not reveal to him which of the addresses he blindsigned it
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is -- he does not learn the relation between the utxos that will be contributed
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to the mix transaction, and the mixed or the change utxos that it will replace
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them. (Though he and anyone doing blockchain analysis can trace the
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change coins by the sudoko attack. But the sudoko attack is irrelevant to
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coins that are all the same round number of bitcoin, such as 10mBTC)
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He then creates the transaction, and everyone signs it. If not everyone
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signs, everyone can see what the missing utxos were, the ones that
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were promised, and not delivered, and blacklist them,
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then try again.
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People contributing already mixed utxos do not have to pay transaction fees
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so get back exactly what they contributed.
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People contributing as yet unmixed bitcoin have to pay a portion of the transaction
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fee proportional to the number of utxos contributed and received. This is good for
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them because the free of charge remixed utxos are enlarging their anonymity pool.
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making each mixing transaction part of one enormous anonymity pool instead of many
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tiny anonymity pools.
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If mixing does not work like this, then someone has fucked it up in order to profit from
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it, their users will be traced, and *they* will be traced, then arrested.
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> > The core of my plan has always been Web 3.0, a privacy social net,
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> > and everything else is just monetization, because software never
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> > gets done properly or properly maintained without someone making
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> > money off it.
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> I got what you mean now. Once you reach a point that's indeed a good
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> strategy to reinforce value of the network. You offer those
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> integrate your service to beat metcalfe's law, your network becomes
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> much more stronger. Facebook and some other social networks all
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> followed this path via. 'applications' within them.
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> > I have been trying to do that, but it is hard to get to the front of
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> > the line of all the people who want to tell blockstream why
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> > blockstream should fund them and their projects.
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> Have you really tried? Adam must have had some fidelity to
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> cypherpunks.
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I have not tried, but I have been looking for entry points, and
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have come up empty. One has to have an in, and one has
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to listen before one speaks.s
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