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wallet/docs/ripple.html
reaction.la 5238cda077
cleanup, and just do not like pdfs
Also, needed to understand Byzantine fault tolerant paxos better.

Still do not.
2022-02-20 18:26:44 +10:00

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<p><a href="./index.html"> To Home page</a> </p>
<h1>Ripple</h1>
<p>This rambling explanation fails to explain what
level of anonymity is provided, or how it is provided.
We want aggregative anonymity, cryptographically
secured, with money flowing on chains of trust.</p>
<p>Fails to explain need for integration with
reputation management, fraud problem, ordering, person
to person transactions</p>
<h2>How internet money should work</h2><p>
The idea is that an organization will issue some kind of money
equivalent promises to deliver US dollars, promises to deliver gold,
shares, promises to deliver some service. Let us call the organization
issuing the money Big Money Issue Corp, and the money
Big Money Issue Corp OUs.&nbsp; </p><p>
You will be able to buy Big Money Issue Corp OUs from
Bob, and use them to pay Carol for something. You will
be able to do this over the internet by instant
messaging dropping some money into the instant
message. Let us suppose you pay Carol to deliver some
cigarettes. Carol will know you paid her, and what you
paid her for, and you will be able to prove that Carol
agreed to deliver cigarettes for a certain payment and
that you paid to deliver some cigarettes, prove it to
the whole world, which ordinarily you will not want to
do, but you might want to do if the deal goes bad.
</p><p>
Now the most obvious way to make this work is that the
people operating the financial system know everything
about everyone, and all transactions are on their
computers, readable by the government, who can thereby
tax everyone. </p><p>
We dont want a technology where everyone deals
directly with Big Money Issue Corp, because then Big
Money Corp will be under pressure to refrain from
dealing with this or that person or group, and then it
will have to know its customers, and for a big
organization to know its customers is likely to be
inefficient for the big organization and burdensome for
the customers. </p><p>
We want payments to be provable, and linked to deals,
so that if something goes wrong, the customer can do
something about it but provable and deal linked
payments run contrary to anonymous payments. </p><p>
Cypherpunks had a vision of how anonymous funds
transfer would work on the internet, which vision ran
into some disastrous obstacles.&nbsp; The cypherpunk vision
was built around Chaumian anonymity, but this
technology does not in itself provide many capabilities
that are necessary for internet money, and makes
implementing those capabilities more difficult.&nbsp; In
the Chaumian vision, everyone dealt directly with Big
Money Corp, but Money Corp could not link Bobs payment
to Carol receiving money. Unfortunately, this meant
no recourse for Bob if he paid and Carol stiffed him,
plus the fact that everyone dealt directly with a
single center provided a single point of control
</p><p>
<a href="%3Chttp://ripple.sf.net/">Ripple</a> is a
brilliant insight, great idea, but suffers from the
critical mass problem that afflicts any proposal to
provide competition to the existing government run
money system.&nbsp; </p><p>
In addition to the critical mass problem, governments
tend to treat competition as illegal, once the
competition gets large enough to to make a dent -
observe what is happening to e-gold. E-gold is
attempting to comply with overbearing and intrusive
regulation to the great detriment of its business and
its customers, but the government has no intention that
it be possible for e-gold to comply. Of course a
decentralized system is a lot more resistant to this
than a centralized system such as e-gold. E-gold looks
like being the Napster of internet money one that
showed the way, though it was ultimately suppressed.&nbsp;
</p><p>
Therefore, in my opinion, the best prospect for a
decentralized money system such as ripple is in some
activity that is already somewhat illegal, for example a
file sharing system, in which the participants grant
each other upload credits.&nbsp; </p><p>
Ripple, as it stands at present, does not really address
the routing problem, (in the sense that the proposed
routing algorithm sucks), and indeed does not need to,
for there are very few participants. For a file
sharing system, would need to be more DHT like.&nbsp;
</p><p>
To the extent that a payment system is anonymous, tends
to be used by ordinary criminals and ponzis. This gives
government justification and excuse to shut it down.&nbsp;
</p>
<h2>Requirements of an internet payment system:</h2><p>
Payments should be identifiable by the participants, but
not identifiable by outsiders, and should automatically
generate and maintain the appropriate records on the
participants machines. If you pay a net presence for X,
you should be able to prove to outsiders that you paid
that particular identifiable net presence for that
particular X, but outsiders should not be able to prove
it except with your assistance. This requirement
presupposes a mechanism for identifying net presences -
Zooko based yurls, and/or authorized certificates.
Since we obviously want to transfer money between people
who do not necessarily have authorized certificates,
have to support yurls, which means we have to first have
a yurl system, which at present we do not.&nbsp; </p><p>
To resist shutdown, and keep costs low, a payment system
needs to inherently implement "ripple", making every man
a bank. Ripple, however tends to reduce the profits of
the currency operator, and is some work to implement, so
is generally not done.&nbsp; </p><p>
The problem with Chaums anonymous cash, and Brands'
anonymous cash, as generally envisaged, is that it
relies on a single central server, with which everyone
has a relationship a star shaped network. Internet
networks really have to be power law networks neither
star, nor entirely equal peers. A single central server
is a central point of failure, a point that governments
can attack.&nbsp; </p><p>
"Ripple" means that if the Bank of Whatsit implements
ripple, then you dont need an account with the Bank of
Whatsit. You can do fine with an account with someone
who has an account with the bank of Whatsit. Hey
presto, a power law network.&nbsp; </p><p>
So if you want to buy a domain name registration from
Wonton, a registrar that has an account with the Bank of
Whatsit, and you have an account with Joe, who has an
account with the bank of Whatsit, then Joes machine
tells Bank of Whatsit to pay Wonton. The Bank of
Whatsit only knows that Joe payed Whatsit. Joe knows
that you paid Wonton, but does not know what you paid
Wonton for. Wonton knows you paid them through the Bank
of Whatsit, does not know or care who Joe is, knows what
you paid them for, but cannot prove what you paid them
for. You know, and can prove, that you paid Wonton, and
can prove what you paid them for.&nbsp; </p><p>
Now what I have described is all account based no
Brand style or Chaum style anonymous tokens. But if the
Bank of Whatsit implements ripple, Joe, or anyone else,
*can* implement Chaum style or Brand style anonymous
tokens. Further, you can pay Wonton using Joes tokens
even if Wonton has no relationship with Joe, and has
never heard of these new fangled tokens, and the Bank of
Whatsit has never heard of them either, for through
ripple you can turn the token payment into an ordinary
account payment from the Bank of Whatsit.&nbsp; </p><p>
Thus if we had payment guys implementing ripple, they
could avoid the heat that is likely to arise from
implementing Chaum style tokens, indeed be entirely
unaware of either those tokens or that heat, combining
the anonymity that comes from Chaum style tokens with
the anonymity that comes from the faceless crowd of a
power law network.&nbsp; </p>
<p style="background-color : #ccffcc; font-size:80%">These documents are
licensed under the <a rel="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/">Creative
Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 License</a></p>
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