Amended "stake" to "shares"

docs/blockdag_consensus.md

@@ -77,11 +77,11 @@ from the same representative sample.
 
 For each peer that could be on the network, including those that have been
 sleeping in a cold wallet for years, each peer keeps a running cumulative
-total of that peers stake. With every new block, the peers stake is added to
+total of that peers shares. With every new block, the peers shares is added to
 its total.
 
 On each block of the chain, a peer’s rank is the bit position of the highest
-bit of the running total that rolled over when its stake was added for that
+bit of the running total that rolled over when its shares was added for that
 block.
 
 *edit note*
@@ -94,13 +94,13 @@ Which gives the same outcome, that on average and over time, the total weight wi
 
 *end edit note*
 
-So if Bob has a third of the stake of Carol, and $N$ is a rank that
-corresponds to bit position higher than the stake of either of them, then
+So if Bob has a third of the shares of Carol, and $N$ is a rank that
+corresponds to bit position higher than the shares of either of them, then
 Bob gets to be rank $R$ or higher one third as often as Carol. But even if
-his stake is very low, he gets to be high rank every now and then.
+his he has a very small shareholding, he gets to be high rank every now and then.
 
 A small group of the highest ranking peers get to decide on the next block,
-and the likelihood of being a high ranking peer depends on stake.
+and the likelihood of being a high ranking peer depends on shares.
 
 They produce the next block by unanimous agreement and joint signature.
 The group is small enough that this is likely to succeed, and if they do not,
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ this, and the system needs to be able to produce a sensible result even if
 some peers maliciously or through failure do not generate sequential
 signature sequence numbers.
 
-Which, in the event of a fork, will on average reflect the total stake of
+Which, in the event of a fork, will on average reflect the total shares of
 peers on that fork.
 
 If two prongs have the same weight, take the prong with the most transactions.  If they have the same weight and the same number of transactions, hash all the public keys of the signatories that formed the
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ blocks, their ranks, and the block height of the root of the fork and take
 the prong with the largest hash.
 
 This value, the weight of a prong of the fork will, over time for large deep
-forks, approximate the stake of the peers online on that prong, without the
+forks, approximate the shares of the peers online on that prong, without the
 painful cost taking a poll of all peers online, and without the considerable
 risk that that poll will be jammed by hostile parties.
 
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ I have become inclined to believe that there is no way around making
 some peers special, but we need to distribute the specialness fairly and
 uniformly, so that every peer get his turn being special at a certain block
 height, with the proportion of block heights at which he is special being
-proportional to his stake.
+proportional to his shares.
 
 If the number of peers that have a special role in forming the next block is
 very small, and the selection and organization of those peers is not
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ while blocks that received the other branch first continue to work on that
 branch, until one branch gets ahead of the other branch, whereupon the
 leading branch spreads rapidly through the peers.  With proof of share, that
 is not going work, one can lengthen a branch as fast as you please.  Instead,
-each branch has to be accompanied by evidence of the weight of stake of
+each branch has to be accompanied by evidence of the weight of shares of
 peers on that branch.  Which means the winning branch can start spreading
 immediately.
 
@@ -681,17 +681,17 @@ limit, see:
   themselves can commit transactions through the peers, if the clients
   themselves hold the secret keys and do not need to trust the peers.
 
-# Calculating the stake of a peer
+# Calculating the shares represented by a peer
 
 We intend that peers will hold no valuable or lasting secrets, that all the
 value and the power will be in client wallets, and the client wallets with
 most of the value, who should have most of the power, will seldom be online.
 
-I propose proof of share.  The stake of a peer is not the stake it owns, but
-the stake that it has injected into the blockchain on behalf of its clients
-and that its clients have not spent yet, or stake that some client wallet
+I propose proof of share.  The shares of a peer is not the shares it owns, but
+the shares that it has injected into the blockchain on behalf of its clients
+and that its clients have not spent yet, or shares that some client wallet
 somewhere has chosen to be represented by that peer.  Likely only the
-whales will make a deliberate and conscious decision to have their stake
+whales will make a deliberate and conscious decision to have their shares
 represented by a peer, and it will be a peer that they likely control, or that
 someone they have some relationship with controls, but not necessarily a
 peer that they use for transactions.

docs/design/proof_of_share.md

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ Initial Public Offering (IPO).
 {target="_blank"}
 
 Because current blockchains are proof of work, rather than proof of
-stake, they give coin holders no power. Thus an initial coin offering
+shares, they give coin holders no power. Thus an initial coin offering
 (ICO) is not a promise of general authority over the assets of the
 proposed company, but a promise of future goods or services that will be
 provided by the company. A proof of share ICO could function as a more
@@ -451,12 +451,12 @@ be controlled by private keys known only to client wallets, but most
 transactions or transaction outputs shall be registered with one
 specific peer.  The blockchain will record a peer’s uptime, its
 provision of storage and bandwidth to the blockchain, and the amount of
-stake registered with a peer.  To be a peer in good standing, a peer has
+shares registered with a peer.  To be a peer in good standing, a peer has
 to have a certain amount of uptime, supply a certain amount of bandwidth
-and storage to the blockchain, and have a certain amount of stake
+and storage to the blockchain, and have a certain amount of shares
 registered to it.  Anything it signed as being in accordance with the
 rules of the blockchain must have been in accordance with the rules of
-the blockchain.  Thus client wallets that control large amounts of stake
+the blockchain.  Thus client wallets that control large amounts of shares
 vote which peers matter, peers vote which peer is primus inter pares,
 and the primus inter pares settles double spending conflicts and
 suchlike.
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ protocol where they share transactions around.
 During gossip, they also share opinions on the total past of the blockchain.
 
 If each peer tries to support past consensus, tries to support the opinion of
-what looks like it might be the majority of peers by stake that it sees in
+what looks like it might be the majority of peers by shares that it sees in
 past gossip events, then we get rapid convergence to a single view of the
 less recent past, though each peer initially has its own view of the very
 recent past.
@@ -688,20 +688,20 @@ network, we need the one third plus one to reliably verify that there
 is no other one third plus one, by sampling geographically distant
 and network address distant groups of nodes.
 
-So, we have fifty percent by weight of stake plus one determining policy,
+So, we have fifty percent by weight of shares plus one determining policy,
 and one third of active peers on the network that have been nominated by
-fifty percent plus one of weight of stake to give effect to policy
+fifty percent plus one of weight of shares to give effect to policy
 selecting particular blocks, which become official when fifty percent plus
 one of active peers the network that have been nominated by fifty percent
-plus one of weight of stake have acked the outcome selected by one third
+plus one of weight of shares have acked the outcome selected by one third
 plus one of active peers.
 
 In the rare case where half the active peers see timeouts from the other
 half of the active peers, and vice versa, we could get two blocks, each
 endorsed by one third of the active peers, which case would need to be
-resolved by a fifty one percent vote of weight of stake voting for the
+resolved by a fifty one percent vote of weight of shares voting for the
 acceptable outcome that is endorsed by the largest group of active peers,
-but the normal outcome is that half the weight of stake receives
+but the normal outcome is that half the weight of shares receives
 notification (the host representing them receives notification) of one
 final block selected by one third of the active peers on the network,
 without receiving notification of a different final block.

docs/libraries.md

@@ -1412,7 +1412,7 @@ transaction affecting the payee factor state.  A transaction has no immediate
 affect.  The payer mutable substate changes in a way reflecting the
 transaction block at the next block boundary.  And that change then has
 effect on product mutable state at a subsequent product state block
-boundary, changing the stake possessed by the substate.
+boundary, changing the shares possessed by the substate.
 
 Which then has effect on the payee mutable  substate at its next
 block boundary when the payee substate links back to the previous

docs/manifesto/crypto_currency.md

@@ -16,11 +16,19 @@ A hundred or so big peers, who do not trust each other, each manage a copy of th
 
 The latest block is signed by peers representing a majority of the shares, which is likely to be considerably less than a hundred or so peers.
 
-Peer share is delegated from clients – probably a small minority of big clients – not all clients will delegate. Delegation makes privacy more complicated and leakier. Delegations will be infrequent – you can delegate the stake held by an offline cold wallet, whose secret lives in pencil on paper in a cardboard file in a safe, but a peer to which the stake was delegated has to have its secret on line.
+Peer share is delegated from clients –- probably a small minority of big clients –-
+not all clients will delegate. Delegation makes privacy more complicated and leakier.
+Delegations will be infrequent –- you can delegate the shares held by an offline cold wallet,
+whose secret lives in pencil on paper in a cardboard file in a safe,
+but a peer to which the shares were delegated has to have its secret on line.
 
 Each peer’s copy of the blockchain is managed, within a rack on the premises of a peer, by a hundred or so shards. The shards trust each other, but that trust does not extend outside the rack, which is probably in a room with a lock on the door and a security camera watching the rack.
 
-Most people transacting on the blockchain are clients of a peer. The blockchain is in the form of a sharded Merkle-patricia tree, hence the clients do not have to trust their host – they can verify any small fact about the blockchain in that they can verify that peers reflecting a majority of stake assert that so and so is true, and each client can verify that the peers have not rewritten the past.
+Most people transacting on the blockchain are clients of a peer. The blockchain
+is in the form of a sharded Merkle-patricia tree, hence the clients do not
+have to trust their host – they can verify any small fact about the blockchain in
+that they can verify that peers reflecting a majority of shares assert that
+so and so is true, and each client can verify that the peers have not rewritten the past.
 
 Scale is achieved through the client peer hierarchy, and, within each peer, by sharding the blockchain.
 
@@ -28,7 +36,7 @@ Clients verify those transactions that concern them, but cannot verify that all
 
 In each transaction, each client verifies that the other client is seeing the same history and recent state of the blockchain, and in this sense, the blockchain is a consensus of all clients, albeit that consensus is mediated through a small number of large entities that have a lot of power.
 
-The architecture of power is rather like a corporation, with stake as shares.
+The architecture of power is rather like a corporation.
 In a corporation CEO can do anything, except the board can fire him and
 choose a new CEO at any time. The shareholders could in theory fire the
 board at any time, but in practice, if less than happy with the board, have
@@ -46,13 +54,25 @@ have tried. Delegated power representing assets, rather than people, results
 in centralized power that, by and large, mostly, pursues the interests of
 those assets. Delegated power representing people, not so much.
 
-In bitcoin, power is in the hands of a very small number of very large miners. This is a problem, both in concentration of power, which seems difficult to avoid if making decisions rapidly about very large amounts of data, and in that miner interests differ from stakeholder interests. Miners consume very large amounts of power, so have fixed locations vulnerable to state power. They have generally relocated to places outside the US hegemony, into the Chinese or Russian hegemonies, or the periphery of those hegemonies, but this is not a whole lot of security.
+In bitcoin, power is in the hands of a very small number of very large miners.
+This is a problem, both in concentration of power, which seems difficult to
+avoid if making decisions rapidly about very large amounts of data,
+and in that miner interests differ from shareholder interests. Miners
+consume very large amounts of power, so have fixed locations vulnerable to state power.
+They have generally relocated to places outside the US hegemony,
+into the Chinese or Russian hegemonies, or the periphery of those hegemonies,
+but this is not a whole lot of security.
 
 "Proof of stake" was sold as the whales, rather than the miners, controlling the currency, but as implemented by Ether, this is not what happened, rather a secretive cabal controls the currency, so the phrase is damaged.  It is used to refer to a very wicked system.
 
 So I will use the term "Proof of Share" to mean the whales actually controlling the currency.
 
-Proof of share has the advantage that stake is ultimately knowledge of secret keys, and while the state could find the peers representing a majority of stake, they are more mobile than miners, and the state cannot easily find the clients that have delegated stake to one peer, and could easily delegate it to a different peer, the underlying secret likely being offline on pencil and paper in someone’s safe, and hard to figure out whose safe.
+Proof of share has the advantage that shares are ultimately knowledge of secret keys,
+and while the state could find the peers representing a majority of shares,
+they are more mobile than miners, and the state cannot easily find the clients
+that have delegated shares to one peer, and could easily delegate it to a different peer,
+the underlying secret likely being offline on pencil and paper in someone’s safe,
+and hard to figure out whose safe.
 
 Obviously, at full scale we are always going to have immensely more clients than full peers, likely by a factor of hundreds of thousands, but we need to have enough peers, which means we need to reward peers for being peers, for providing the service of storing blockchain data, propagating transactions, verifying the blockchain, and making the data readily available, rather than for the current pointless bit crunching and waste of electricity employed by current mining.
 
@@ -62,12 +82,12 @@ The power over the blockchain, and the revenues coming from transaction and stor
 
 Also, at scale, we are going to have to shard, so that a peer is actually a pool of machines, each with a shard of the blockchain, perhaps with all the machines run by one person, perhaps run by a group of people who trust each other, each of whom runs one machine managing one shard of the blockchain.
 
-Rewards, and the decision as to which chain is final, has to go to weight of stake, but also to proof of service – to peers, who store and check the blockchain and make it available. For the two to be connected, the peers have to get stake delegated to them by providing services to clients.
+Rewards, and the decision as to which chain is final, has to go to weight of shares, but also to proof of service – to peers, who store and check the blockchain and make it available. For the two to be connected, the peers have to get shares delegated to them by providing services to clients.
 
-All durable keys should live in client wallets, because they can be secured off the internet.  So how do we implement weight of stake, since only peers are sufficiently well connected to actually participate in governance?
+All durable keys should live in client wallets, because they can be secured off the internet.  So how do we implement weight of shares, since only peers are sufficiently well connected to actually participate in governance?
 
-To solve this problem, stakes are held by client wallets.  Stakes that are in the clear get registered with a peer, the registration gets recorded in the blockchain, and the peer gets influence, and to some
-extent rewards, proportional to the stake registered with it, conditional on the part it is doing to supply data storage, verification, and bandwidth.
+To solve this problem, shares are held by client wallets.  Shares that are in the clear get registered with a peer, the registration gets recorded in the blockchain, and the peer gets influence, and to some
+extent rewards, proportional to the shares registered with it, conditional on the part it is doing to supply data storage, verification, and bandwidth.
 
 My original plan was to produce a better bitcoin from pair based
 cryptography.  But pair based cryptography is slow.  Peers would need a

docs/manifesto/social_networking.md

@@ -1238,7 +1238,7 @@ But we can do the important things, which are social media and blockchain.
 With social networking on top of this protocol, we can then do blockchain
 and crypto currency.  We then do trades between crypto currencies on the
 blockchain, bypassing the regulated quasi state exchanges, which trades
-are safe provided a majority of the stake of peers on the blockchain that is
+are safe provided a majority of the shares of peers on the blockchain that is
 held by peers holding two peer wallets, one in each crypto currency being
 exchanged, are honest.
 
@@ -1268,7 +1268,7 @@ blockchain.
 Information wants to be free, but programmers need to be paid.   We want
 the currency, the blockdag, to be able to function as a corporation so that it
 can pay the developers to improve the software in ways likely to add value
-to the stake.
+to the shares.
 
 # Many sovereign corporations on the blockchain
 
@@ -1391,9 +1391,9 @@ of truckers who each owned their own truck.  The coup was in large
 State incorporated corporations derive their corporateness from the
 authority of the sovereign, but a proof of share currency derives its
 corporateness from the cryptographically discovered consensus that gives
-each stakeholder incentive to go along with the cryptographically
+each shareholder incentive to go along with the cryptographically
 discovered consensus because everyone else is going with the consensus,
-each stakeholder playing by the rules because all the other stakeholders
+each shareholder playing by the rules because all the other shareholders
 play by those rules.
 
 Such a corporation is sovereign.

docs/names/names.md

@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ work, rather than proof of share, and the state’s computers can easily mount
 a fifty one percent attack on proof of work. We need a namecoin like system
 but based on proof of share, rather than proof of work, so that for the state
 to take it over, it would need to pay off fifty one percent of the
-stakeholders – and thus pay off the people who are hiding behind the name
+shareholders – and thus pay off the people who are hiding behind the name
 system to perform untraceable crypto currency transactions and to speak the
 unspeakable.
 

docs/scale_clients_trust.md

@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ their name and assets in a frequently changing public key. Every time
 money moves from the main chain to a sidechain, or from one sidechain to
 another, the old coin is spent, and a new coin is created. The public key on
 the mainchain coin corresponds to [a frequently changing secret that is distributed]
-between the peers on the sidechain in proportion to their stake.
+between the peers on the sidechain in proportion to their share.
 
 The mainchain transaction is a big transaction between many sidechains,
 that contains a single output or input from each side chain, with each
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ necessary that what we do implement be upwards compatible with this scaling desi
 
 ## proof of share
 
-Make the stake of a peer the value of coins (unspent transaction outputs)
+Make the share of a peer the value of coins (unspent transaction outputs)
 that were injected into the blockchain through that peer. This ensures that
 the interests of the peers will be aligned with the whales, with the interests
 of those that hold a whole lot of value on  the blockchain. Same principle