2022-02-16 00:53:01 -05:00
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---
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title: Scaling, trust and clients
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---
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# Client trust
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When there are billions of people using the blockchain, it will inevitably
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only be fully verified by a few hundred or at most a few thousand major
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peers, who will inevitably have [interests that do not necessarily coincide]
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with those of the billions of users, who will inevitably have only client
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wallets.
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[interests that do not necessarily coincide]:https://vitalik.ca/general/2021/05/23/scaling.html
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"Vitalik Buterin talks blockchain scaling"
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And a few hundred seems to be the minimum size required to stop peers
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with a lot of clients from doing nefarious things. At scale, we are going to
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approach the limits of distributed trust.
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There are several cures for this. Well, not cures, but measures that can
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alleviate the disease
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None of these are yet implemented, and we will not get around to
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implementing them until we start to take over the world. But it is
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necessary that what we do implement be upwards compatible with this scaling design:
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## proof of stake
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Make the stake of a peer the value of coins (unspent transaction outputs)
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that were injected into the blockchain through that peer. This ensures that
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the interests of the peers will be aligned with the whales, with the interests
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of those that hold a whole lot of value on the blockchain. Same principle
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as a well functioning company board. A company board directly represents
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major shareholders, whose interests are for the most part aligned with
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ordinary shareholders. (This is apt to fail horribly when an accounting or
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law firm is on the board, or a converged investment fund.) This measure
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gives power the whales, who do not want their hosts to do nefarious things.
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## client verification
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every single client verifies the transactions that it is directly involved in,
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and a subset of the transactions that gave rise to the coins that it receives.
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If it verified the ancestry of every coin it received all the way back, it
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would have to verify the entire blockchain, but it can verify the biggest
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ancestor of the biggest ancestor and a random subset of ancestors, thus
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invalid transactions are going immediately generate problems. If every
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client unpredictably verifies a small number of transactions, the net effect
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is going to be that most transactions are going to be unpredictably verified
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by several clients.
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## sharding, many blockchains
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Coins in a shard are shares in [sovereign cipher corporations] whose
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primary asset is a coin on the primary blockchain that vests power over
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their name and assets in a frequently changing public key. Every time
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money moves from the main chain to a sidechain, or from one sidechain to
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another, the old coin is spent, and a new coin is created. The public key on
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the mainchain coin corresponds to [a frequently changing secret that is distributed]
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between the peers on the sidechain in proportion to their stake.
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The mainchain transaction is a big transaction between many sidechains,
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that contains a single output or input from each side chain, with each
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single input or output from each sidechain representing many single
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transactions between sidechains, and each single transaction between
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sidechains representing many single transactions between many clients of
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each sidechain.
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The single big mainchain transaction merkle chains to the total history of
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each sidechain, and each client of a sidechain can verify any state
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information about his sidechain against the most recent sidechain
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transaction on the mainchain, and routinely does.
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## lightning layer
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The [lightning layer] is the correct place for privacy and contracts – because
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we do not want every transaction, let alone every contract, appearing on
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the mainchain. Keeping as much stuff as possible *off* the blockchain helps
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with both privacy and scaling.
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## zk-snarks
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Zk-snarks are not yet a solution. They have enormous potential
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benefits for privacy and scaling, but as yet, no one has quite found a way.
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A zk-snark is a succinct proof that code *was* executed on an immense pile
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of data, and produced the expected, succinct, result. It is a witness that
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someone carried out the calculation he claims he did, and that calculation
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produced the result he claimed it did. So not everyone has to verify the
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blockchain from beginning to end. And not everyone has to know what
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inputs justified what outputs.
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The innumerable privacy coins around based on zk-snarks are just not
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doing what has to be done to make a zk-snark privacy currency that is
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viable at any reasonable scale. They are intentionally scams, or by
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negligence, unintentionally scams. All the zk-snark coins are doing the
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step from set $N$ of valid coins, valid unspent transaction outputs, to set
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$N+1$, in the old fashioned Satoshi way, and sprinkling a little bit of
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zk-snark magic privacy pixie dust on top (because the task of producing a
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genuine zk-snark proof of coin state for step $N$ to step $N+1$ is just too big
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for them). Which is, intentionally or unintentionally, a scam.
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Not yet an effective solution for scaling the blockchain, for to scale the
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blockchain, you need a concise proof that any spend in the blockchain was
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only spent once, and while a zk-snark proving this is concise and
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capable of being quickly evaluated by any client, generating the proof is
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an enormous task. Lots of work is being done to render this task
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manageable, but as yet, last time I checked, not manageable at scale.
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Rendering it efficient would be a total game changer, radically changing
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the problem.
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The fundamental problem is that in order to produce a compact proof that
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the set of coins, unspent transaction outputs, of state $N+1$ was validly
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derived from the set of coins at state $N$, you actually have to have those
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sets of coins, which is not very compact at all, and generate a compact
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proof about a tree lookup and cryptographic verification for each of the
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changes in the set.
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This is an inherently enormous task at scale, which will have to be
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factored into many, many subtasks, performed by many, many machines.
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Factoring the problem up is hard, for it not only has to be factored, divided
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up, it has to be divided up in a way that is incentive compatible, or else
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the blockchain is going to fail at scale because of peer misconduct,
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transactions are just not going to be validated. Factoring a problem is hard,
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and factoring that has to be mindful of incentive compatibility is
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considerably harder. I am seeing a lot of good work grappling with the
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problem of factoring, dividing the problem into manageable subtasks, but
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it seems to be totally oblivious to the hard problem of incentive compatibility at scale.
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Incentive compatibility was Satoshi's brilliant insight, and the client trust
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problem is failure of Satoshi's solution to that problem to scale. Existing
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zk-snark solutions fail at scale, though in a different way. With zk-snarks,
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the client can verify the zk-snark, but producing a valid zk-snark in the
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first place is going to be hard, and will rapidly get harder as the scale
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increases.
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A zk-snark that succinctly proves that the set of coins (unspent transaction
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outputs) at block $N+1$ was validly derived from the set of coins at
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block $N$, and can also prove that any given coin is in that set or not in that
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set is going to have to be a proof about many, many, zk-snarks produced
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by many, many machines, a proof about a very large dag of zk-snarks,
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each zk-snark a vertex in the dag proving some small part of the validity
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of the step from consensus state $N$ of valid coins to consensus state
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$N+1$ of valid coins, and the owners of each of those machines that produced a tree
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vertex for the step from set $N$ to set $N+1$ will need a reward proportionate
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to the task that they have completed, and the validity of the reward will
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need to be part of the proof, and there will need to be a market in those
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rewards, with each vertex in the dag preferring the cheapest source of
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child vertexes. Each of the machines would only need to have a small part
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of the total state $N$, and a small part of the transactions transforming state
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$N$ into state $N+1$. This is hard but doable, but I am just not seeing it done yet.
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I see good [proposals for factoring the work], but I don't see them
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addressing the incentive compatibility problem. It needs a whole picture
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design, rather than a part of the picture design. A true zk-snark solution
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has to shard the problem of producing state $N+1$, the set of unspent
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transaction outputs, from state $N$, so it should also shard the problem of
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producing a consensus on the total set and order of transactions.
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[proposals for factoring the work]:https://hackmd.io/@vbuterin/das
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"Data Availability Sampling Phase 1 Proposal"
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### The problem with zk-snarks
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Last time I checked, [Cairo] was not ready for prime time.
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[Cairo]:https://starkware.co/cairo/
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"Cairo - StarkWare Industries Ltd."
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Maybe it is ready now.
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The two basic problems with zk-snarks is that even though a zk-snark
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proving something about an enormous data set is quite small and can be
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quickly verified by anyone, it requires enormous computational resources to
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generate the proof, and how does the end user know that the verification
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verifies what it is supposed to verify?
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To solve the first problem, need distributed generation of the proof,
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constructing a zk-snark that is a proof about a dag of zk-snarks,
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effectively a zk-snark implementation of the map-reduce algorithm for
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massive parallelism. In general map-reduce requires trusted shards that
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will not engage in Byzantine defection, but with zk-snarks they can be
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untrusted, allowing the problem to be massively distributed over the
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internet.
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To solve the second problem, need an [intelligible scripting language for
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generating zk-snarks], a scripting language that generates serial verifiers
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and massively parallel map-reduce proofs.
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[intelligible scripting language for
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generating zk-snarks]:https://www.cairo-lang.org
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"Welcome to Cairo
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A Language For Scaling DApps Using STARKs"
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Both problems are being actively worked on. Both problems need a good deal
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more work, last time I checked. For end user trust in client wallets
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relying on zk-snark verification to be valid, at least some of the end
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users of client wallets will need to themselves generate the verifiers from
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2022-02-18 15:59:12 -05:00
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the script.
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2022-02-16 00:53:01 -05:00
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For trust based on zk-snarks to be valid, a very large number of people
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must themselves have the source code to a large program that was
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executed on an immense amount of data, and must themselves build and
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run the verifier to prove that this code was run on the actual data at least
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once, and produced the expected result, even though very few of them will
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ever execute that program on actual data, and there is too much data for
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any one computer to ever execute the program on all the data.
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Satoshi's fundamental design was that all users should verify the
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blockchain, which becomes impractical when the blockchain approaches four
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hundred gigabytes. A zk-snark design needs to redesign blockchains from
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the beginning, with distributed generation of the proof, but the proof for
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each step in the chain, from mutable state $N$ to mutable state $N+1$, from set
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$N$ of coins, unspent transaction outputs, to set $N+1$ of coins only being
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generated once or generated a quite small number of times, with its
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generation being distributed over all peers through map-reduce, while the
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proof is verified by everyone, peer and client.
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For good verifier performance, with acceptable prover performance, one
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should construct a stark that can be verified quickly, and then produce
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a libsnark that it was verified at least once ([libsnark proof generation
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being costly], but the proofs are very small and quickly verifiable).
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At the end of the day, we still need the code generating and executing the
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verification of zk-snarks to be massively replicated, in order that all
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this rigmarole with zk-snarks and starks is actually worthy of producing
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trust.
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[libsnark proof generation being costly]:https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/046.pdf
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"Scalable computational integrity:
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section 1.3.2: concrete performance"
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This is not a problem I am working on, but I would be happy to see a
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solution. I am seeing a lot of scam solutions, that sprinkle zk-snarks over
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existing solutions as magic pixie dust, like putting wings on a solid fuel
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rocket and calling it a space plane.
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[lightning layer]:lightning_layer.html
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[sovereign cipher corporations]:social_networking.html#many-sovereign-corporations-on-the-blockchain
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[a frequently changing secret that is distributed]:multisignature.html#scaling
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# sharding within each single very large peer
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Sharding within a single peer is an easier problem than sharding the
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blockchain between mutually distrustful peers capable of Byzantine
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defection, and the solutions are apt to be more powerful and efficient.
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When we go to scale, when we have very large peers on the blockchain,
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we are going to have to have sharding within each very large peer, which will
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multiprocess in the style of Google's massively parallel multiprocessing,
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where scaling and multiprocessing is embedded in interactions with the
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massively distributed database, either on top of an existing distributed
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database such as Rlite or Cockroach, or we will have to extend the
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consensus algorithm so that the shards of each cluster form their own
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distributed database, or extend the consensus algorithm so that peers can
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shard. As preparation for the latter possibility, we need to have each peer
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only form gossip events with a small and durable set of peers with which it
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has lasting relationships, because the events, as we go to scale, tend to
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have large and unequal costs and benefits for each peer. Durable
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relationships make sharding possible, but we will not worry to much about
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sharding until a forty terabyte blockchain comes in sight.
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When we go to scale, we are going to have to have sharding, which will
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multiprocess in the style of Google’s massively parallel multiprocessing,
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where scaling and multiprocessing is embedded in interactions with the
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massively distributed database, either on top of an existing distributed
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database such as Rlite or Cockroach, or we will have to extend the
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consensus algorithm so that the shards of each cluster form their own
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distributed database, or extend the consensus algorithm so that peers can
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shard. As preparation for the latter possibility, we need to have each peer
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only form gossip events with a small and durable set of peers with which it
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has lasting relationships, because the events, as we go to scale, tend to
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have large and unequal costs and benefits for each peer. Durable
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relationships make sharding possible, but we will not worry to much about
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sharding until a forty terabyte blockchain comes in sight.
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For sharding, each peer has a copy of a subset of the total blockchain, and
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some peers have a parity set of many such subsets, each peer has a subset
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of the set of unspent transaction outputs as of consensus on total order at
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one time, and is working on constructing a subset of the set of unspent
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transactions as of a recent consensus on total order, each peer has all the
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root hashes of all the balanced binary trees of all the subsets, but not all
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the subsets, each peer has durable relationships with a set of peers that
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have the entire collection of subsets, and two durable relationships with
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peers that have parity sets of all the subsets.
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Each subset of the append only immutable set of transactions is represented
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by a balanced binary tree of hashes representing $2^n$ blocks of
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the blockchain, and each subset of the mutable set of unspent transaction
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outputs is a subsection of the Merkle-patricia tree of transaction outputs,
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which is part of a directed acyclic graph of all consensus sets of all past
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consensus states of transaction outputs, but no one keeps that entire graph
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around once it gets too big, as it rapidly will, only various subsets of it.
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But they keep the hashes around that can prove that any subset of it was
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part of the consensus at some time.
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Gossip vertexes immutable added to the immutable chain of blocks will
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contain the total hash of the state of unspent transactions as of a previous
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consensus block, thus the immutable and ever growing blockchain will contain
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an immutable record of all past consensus Merkle-patricia trees of
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unspent transaction outputs, and thus of the past consensus about the
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dynamic and changing state resulting from the immutable set of all past
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transactions
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For very old groups of blocks to be discardable, it will from time to time be
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necessary to add repeat copies of old transaction outputs that are still
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unspent, so that the old transactions that gave rise to them can be
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discarded, and one can then re-evaluate the state of the blockchain starting
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from the middle, rather than the very beginning.
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