1513 lines
74 KiB
Markdown
1513 lines
74 KiB
Markdown
|
---
|
|||
|
title: >-
|
|||
|
Bitzion: how Bitcoin becomes a state
|
|||
|
---
|
|||
|
It probably won’t happen. It probably should.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Statelike nonstates fascinate all political engineers. Can a nonstate
|
|||
|
become a state? How are states born? What paths, if it wants to live,
|
|||
|
should a baby state follow?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
History is full of examples. But most of them are too ancient for most
|
|||
|
of us to parse. The vulgar and legible present is frustratingly short of
|
|||
|
high-quality newborn states.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
One path to statehood is military. The CJNG or Jalisco New Generation
|
|||
|
Cartel, a Mexican narco gang, recently posted a video of an impressive
|
|||
|
military parade, with hundreds of uniformed soldiers and tens of armored
|
|||
|
vehicles—almost ISIS tier. ISIS in its day, as Gladstone said of the
|
|||
|
Confederacy, “had made an army, and made a nation.”
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
But having made these things—a state must also keep them. Vae victis!
|
|||
|
In the end, sovereignty is empirical. Cartels, ISIS, the Confederacy and
|
|||
|
Rhodesia aren’t super encouraging examples.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Yet after this list of almost-states comes very solid and palpable
|
|||
|
nations, like Israel, Singapore and our own dear United States.
|
|||
|
Empirically, states do get born.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
So, empirically, is Bitcoin a state? Or almost a state? Can it become a
|
|||
|
state? Or at least, a virtual state?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitcoin has not yet made a nation. It has certainly made a treasury. Its
|
|||
|
path is not at all military—except if math is a weapon. But isn’t math
|
|||
|
a weapon? Surely math has as good a chance as the CJNG, and you wouldn’t
|
|||
|
want to mess with the CJNG. “Pura gente del Señor Mencho!” In fact,
|
|||
|
Bitcoin and the CJNG even have similar market caps...
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Three attributes of sovereignty
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
When we examine the early life of successful states, we see that newborn
|
|||
|
regimes which live to become stable adults tend to focus on three
|
|||
|
attributes: independence, legitimacy, and coherence.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Independence means the regime does not depend on the will of any outside
|
|||
|
power. Legitimacy means that the regime considers itself authentic and
|
|||
|
official, and conducts itself with the dignity of a state. Coherence
|
|||
|
means the whole state can act effectively as a single agent, with a
|
|||
|
united regime calling on the full resources of all its citizens.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In the ways that Bitcoin works well, it has all three. Abstractly, the
|
|||
|
ledger itself is independent, legitimate and cohesive. But as a new
|
|||
|
state rises, reality tests it more and more stringently. Some respond to
|
|||
|
hard tests by becoming stronger. Others crumble.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitcoin today has cracks in all three attributes of statehood. These
|
|||
|
cracks may or may not need to be filled. Filling them may or may not
|
|||
|
result in any kind of success. We can still describe how they should be
|
|||
|
filled—as a theoretical lesson in political engineering.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
We can also describe how Bitcoin, with these vertical cracks filled, can
|
|||
|
also expand horizontally. It will both increase its effectiveness, and
|
|||
|
expand its scope. We’ll project this growth outward until Bitcoin turns
|
|||
|
into Bitzion—a purely hypothetical utopia, which needs no fiddling
|
|||
|
with definitions to be a clear and obvious digital state.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Historically, Bitcoin has been extremely resistant to innovation in
|
|||
|
governance. And, as we’ll see, the principles of effective digital
|
|||
|
governance are extremely counterintuitive. This makes it unlikely that
|
|||
|
anything like Bitzion will actually happen. But since it could happen,
|
|||
|
it makes the best possible kind of thought-experiment.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitcoin: from algorithm to state
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Again, while Bitcoin has made neither an army nor a nation, it has made
|
|||
|
a treasury. This treasury is its market cap, which indeed resembles the
|
|||
|
balance sheet of a minor state—without any of the assets. But having
|
|||
|
made a treasury, it must keep it.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
One way to price Bitcoin is as a call option on monetary sovereignty. If
|
|||
|
Bitcoin becomes a state, or merges with a state—becoming either a
|
|||
|
standard hard currency, or a national or global hard currency, de facto
|
|||
|
or de jure—we can expect the option’s price to considerably increase.
|
|||
|
If this outcome grows less likely, the option’s price will fall.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Are “becomes a state” and “becomes a standard” really equivalent?
|
|||
|
Certainly not without an argument—and that argument is the crux of
|
|||
|
this essay.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The difference between Bitcoin as a standard, and Bitcoin as a state, is
|
|||
|
that a state has a government. The argument: to prevail as a monetary
|
|||
|
standard, Bitcoin must up its game. Its most effective way to up its
|
|||
|
game is to form its own government. But once it forms a government, it
|
|||
|
is a state—contradicting its libertarian, decentralized ideology.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Interestingly, the 13 states faced a similar question in the mid-1780s.
|
|||
|
The birth of a centralized national government contradicted much of the
|
|||
|
ideology of the Revolution. Yet the Congress of the Confederation was
|
|||
|
such a shitshow—almost an 18th-century UN—that the
|
|||
|
pre-Constitutional United States has been almost written out of history.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The case for Bitcoin as a state is that a monetary standard with a
|
|||
|
government can work much better than one without one. Bitcoin already
|
|||
|
has a government; but it is (mostly) algorithmic. A human government can
|
|||
|
work much better than an algorithmic one.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
All Bitcoiners agree that not having a government is an advantage, since
|
|||
|
a government is inherently a central point of failure. While this is the
|
|||
|
truth, it is not the whole truth.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Having a central decision point is also an advantage. As hackers, we
|
|||
|
hate choosing between two such advantages. We would like them both. And
|
|||
|
if we cannot have all of both, perhaps we can at least get most of both.
|
|||
|
Such is the good old art of the tradeoff.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Logical case for a Bitcoin government
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Why does Bitcoin need a (human) government?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitcoin at present is a state without a government. If there is one
|
|||
|
thing political scientists know, it is that there is no such thing as a
|
|||
|
state without a government. When a state tries to have no government, it
|
|||
|
always has something.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A blockchain is statelike because independence is the whole point of a
|
|||
|
blockchain. Bitcoin or any other blockchain has two layers of
|
|||
|
governance: serialization, which is inherently algorithmic (execution of
|
|||
|
the ledger protocol); and oversight, which is inherently human
|
|||
|
(management of the protocol and its reference implementation).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Government is human; it means oversight. Bitcoin needs a human central
|
|||
|
government because centralized governments are more effective than
|
|||
|
decentralized governments. An effective government can be trusted to
|
|||
|
choose the best serialization algorithm; so algorithmic serialization is
|
|||
|
just an aspect of human oversight.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitcoin today has serious oversight problems. No one even agrees on who
|
|||
|
has the responsibility of overseeing the blockchain—miners, nodes, or
|
|||
|
developers? This is why Bitcoin is a state without a government.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The only correct answer is hodlers—who are the only group not now
|
|||
|
represented. They could be represented only by constructing a central
|
|||
|
government that represents them. This is just what they should
|
|||
|
do—though it would change the whole story of Bitcoin.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
But since Bitcoin’s independence today is secured by decentralization,
|
|||
|
any central government would need a different security mechanism to
|
|||
|
secure its independence. One such mechanism is pseudonymity.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Pseudonymity has many technical limitations and is a broadly inferior
|
|||
|
substitute for decentralization. Engineers, in pursuit of the perfect
|
|||
|
tradeoff, must often use limited and inferior substitutes.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Intuitive case for a Bitcoin government
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Ultimately, what is Bitcoin? It is a set of human beings with private
|
|||
|
keys, who all use a technical tool that lets them automatically agree on
|
|||
|
digital facts. Bitcoin is the people, their keys, and the ledger—the
|
|||
|
public record of how much money every key owns.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitcoin’s algorithm and infrastructure are a cool tool that these people
|
|||
|
have used to act coherently for their mutual benefit—without uniting
|
|||
|
or cooperating in any other way. Nakamoto consensus is a rope of sand
|
|||
|
that can actually pull a load. The hodlers, a completely atomized
|
|||
|
non-society, nonetheless act coherently when they save in coins.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Collective coherent action for mutual benefit is a tool of essentially
|
|||
|
unlimited power. Algorithmic, decentralized governance has unlocked a
|
|||
|
tiny slice of this power. The normal way in which sets of human beings
|
|||
|
undertake collective coherent action is through central organization.
|
|||
|
This normal government can unlock the rest of the pie.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitcoin, by producing governance without a government, is the exception
|
|||
|
that proves the rule. What this exception tells us is that whatever
|
|||
|
Bitcoin has achieved so far, these achievements are a small fraction of
|
|||
|
what it could achieve with a government.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
While this magic rope of sand is cool and all—while Bitcoin could not
|
|||
|
have been born without it—what about switching to, like, a regular
|
|||
|
nylon rope?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Must this be done? Why must it be done? Can it be done? How would it be
|
|||
|
done? If you have a moment or two, dear reader, we’ll answer these
|
|||
|
questions and more.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitcoin’s oversight is a mess
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitcoin has a reputation for terrible oversight. This reputation is not
|
|||
|
the fault of anyone involved. It is Satoshi’s fault, for leaving
|
|||
|
oversight to anarchy. It is not even clear which group holds the power
|
|||
|
of oversight: nodes, miners, devs, hodlers or users. (Satoshi was a
|
|||
|
genius; but not a god.) Fact: anarchy can make anyone behave badly.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The only proper interpretation of Bitcoin oversight is that Bitcoin’s
|
|||
|
principals are its hodlers. Bitcoin is the ledger. The blockchain is an
|
|||
|
agent that maintains that ledger. The Bitcoin infrastructure must be
|
|||
|
operated in the exclusive service of the ledger, just as any agent must
|
|||
|
act in the exclusive service of its principals. Had Satoshi made this
|
|||
|
clear, or even built a mechanism to enforce it, much suck might have
|
|||
|
been averted.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Anarchy is not the end of the world. But anarchy still sucks.
|
|||
|
Objectively minor meta-decisions, like setting the block size, turn into
|
|||
|
Icelandic sagas. Larger changes are inconceivable. Bitcoin, the OG of
|
|||
|
blockchains, is the couch potato of blockchains. Everyone knows this, so
|
|||
|
there is no reason to dwell on it.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitcoin’s serialization isn’t perfect, either
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitcoin’s serialization—maintaining the integrity of the ledger—has
|
|||
|
a perfect record. No power has ever infringed the independence of
|
|||
|
Bitcoin. Yet hash proof-of-work is not perfect. It is not perfectly
|
|||
|
secure; and it is extremely expensive.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Today, 65% of the world’s mining capacity is in China. So it would be
|
|||
|
straightforward for the Chinese government to squeeze Bitcoin. The CCP
|
|||
|
has not felt the need to try—not because Bitcoin is too strong to
|
|||
|
attack; because it is not important enough to attack. This is not
|
|||
|
independence but the illusion of independence. If Bitcoin is indeed an
|
|||
|
call option on sovereignty, these kinds of illusions are dangerous.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The cost of mining is the price of independence. Currently this price is
|
|||
|
huge: perhaps 5% of market cap per year. Imagine gold had a high vapor
|
|||
|
pressure—every year, 5% of every Krugerrand boiled off into the
|
|||
|
atmosphere. In this alternate universe, no one would even think of using
|
|||
|
gold as money.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitcoin hodlers do not think they are paying this immense wealth tax.
|
|||
|
They are. And it seriously hampers the competitiveness of Bitcoin as a
|
|||
|
currency. Let’s look closely at how this works—these details matter.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The price of Nakamoto consensus
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Mining revenue comes from fees and block rewards. Block rewards are
|
|||
|
straight-up monetary dilution. Proper accounting must measure ownership
|
|||
|
of any equity or cryptocurrency not as the number of units, but as the
|
|||
|
fraction of units outstanding. So creating 1% more units is exactly the
|
|||
|
same as a 1% wealth tax across hodlers—though easier to implement.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Block-reward dilution is bounded, and fees are not dilutive. But fees
|
|||
|
have the same direct impact as rewards: since they need to pay for
|
|||
|
electricity, they are sold for fiat. Miners are generally not hodlers.
|
|||
|
So \$5B of mining means \$5B of selling. Obviously, the seller is the
|
|||
|
natural enemy of the hodler.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
As a currency—a stable bubble—Bitcoin acts like a battery or a
|
|||
|
pressure tank. Its market cap is the pressure in the tank, or the energy
|
|||
|
in the battery. To counteract \$5B in annual outflow and keep the price
|
|||
|
flat, Bitcoin needs \$5B of annual inflow.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This mining leakage gets heavier as the price rises—a vicious
|
|||
|
stabilization loop which tends to cap the price. This is how the cost of
|
|||
|
governance by Nakamoto consensus costs the hodlers money—and tends to
|
|||
|
make hyperbitcoinization impossible.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Imagine Bitcoin’s price if it had no mining leakage—meaning zero
|
|||
|
automatic outflow. Everyone selling would be a defecting hodler. There
|
|||
|
has never been a large number of these, even in the worst crashes.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Algorithmic governance was essential in Bitcoin’s childhood. It created
|
|||
|
a system that was owned by no one. From its genesis block it had this
|
|||
|
essential quality of a state. Nakamoto consensus made Bitcoin
|
|||
|
independent from day one. No other design could have achieved this
|
|||
|
result.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
But statehood has its own ruthless laws. No startup can cling to its
|
|||
|
teddy bear. All must change as they grow. Some of those changes will
|
|||
|
even be in engineering. Today, the cost of Nakamoto consensus is keeping
|
|||
|
Bitcoin from advancing as a monetary standard; and its unbalanced
|
|||
|
decentralization leaves it under China’s thumb.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitcoin imperialism
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
By all except Bitcoin’s proof-of-work purists, it is generally admitted
|
|||
|
that proof-of-stake is the path forward in both layers of
|
|||
|
governance—serialization and oversight.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Many alternate chains already use POS—an unfortunate acronym—as well
|
|||
|
as smarter agreement protocols, chain sharding, and all kinds of other
|
|||
|
fun stuff. (In fact, it would be hard to boot up a new proof-of-work
|
|||
|
chain today—it would be attacked as soon as it was worth attacking.)
|
|||
|
Why not just switch to a newer-generation blockchain platform?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Alas, none of these alternate chains can solve the problems with
|
|||
|
Bitcoin. Instead, Bitcoin will have to defeat them and erase them
|
|||
|
utterly from the earth.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Most Bitcoiners believe this victory is in some sense inevitable, and
|
|||
|
will happen on its own. Is it happening on its own? Or is anyone
|
|||
|
thinking about how to make it happen? This is the mindset of Augustulus,
|
|||
|
not Augustus—a poor start for any empire.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
For it does need to be made to happen. It is not just a matter of
|
|||
|
waiting for altcoins to go away. Rather, Bitcoin needs to actively clean
|
|||
|
them up.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This uber-hardcore flavor of Bitcoin maximalism—call it Bitcoin
|
|||
|
imperialism—would probably shock even most Bitcoin maximalists. But it
|
|||
|
is an inherent consequence of the right theory of why Bitcoin is worth
|
|||
|
anything at all.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Parallel ledgers considered harmful
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
An alternate chain is a parallel ledger. All ledgers must be unified.
|
|||
|
Any partition of monetary energy makes not only each side of the
|
|||
|
partition, but both sides put together, a worse bet than the unified
|
|||
|
ledger. And there is no stable equilibrium between the sides of the
|
|||
|
partition.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In any real economy, at least one asset must be overvalued. That asset
|
|||
|
is money. But given one money that is both standard and perfect, the
|
|||
|
only stable equilibrium is one in which there are no other bubbles, and
|
|||
|
all other assets are priced by yield in that standard. Any such asset
|
|||
|
which has no use has no value, and will sell for no price.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
There is one mathematical revolution in money. Forks and altcoins are
|
|||
|
just bad for it. The revolution in money will be complete when there is
|
|||
|
one standard digital money. This means one standard ledger—the
|
|||
|
“Highlander principle.”
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This standard ledger has to begin with Bitcoin. Bitcoin is the gorilla.
|
|||
|
In any world where Bitcoin ends up worthless, lesser cryptos end up
|
|||
|
worthless too. So there are two ways to resolve any parallel ledger:
|
|||
|
merge it with Bitcoin, or send it to zero.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Generally, any alternate chain worthy of any notice at all has some
|
|||
|
technical advance, purported or real, over Bitcoin. This may be privacy,
|
|||
|
computation, finalization time, mining leakage, Byzantine security, or
|
|||
|
some other useful area of improvement.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
But the real competition is monetary competition between ledgers. This,
|
|||
|
it is hard to imagine Bitcoin losing. Muscle matters more than mind. The
|
|||
|
chimpanzee can ask for a banana in sign language. The gorilla is three
|
|||
|
times as big as the chimpanzee.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The traditional Silicon Valley approach to this conundrum is for the
|
|||
|
gorilla to just kill the chimpanzee and steal his banana. Sometimes, the
|
|||
|
chimp can jump the gorilla from behind, and get him with a rock.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Neither outcome seems quite right. A cryptosystem that aims at the
|
|||
|
legitimacy of a state cannot behave like any kind of ape. We’ll return
|
|||
|
to this issue with an actual plan. However: there can be only one.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Proof-of-stake and political engineering
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Altcoins delenda est. But while their parallel ledgers must vanish with
|
|||
|
the Oscans and the Samnites, as their genuine engineering innovations
|
|||
|
are shamelessly looted like Houston lifting the Nazi space program, many
|
|||
|
have also innovated in governance. Scholarship asks us to start by
|
|||
|
noticing their work; and we will start by following it.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
While proof of work is one thing, proof of stake is a huge family of
|
|||
|
things. This family is united by one general principle. The general
|
|||
|
principle of proof-of-stake is that the ledger belongs to its
|
|||
|
owners—who must therefore be charged with governing it.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
That principle is sound. Bitzion uses it. But it is as general as the
|
|||
|
principle that the nation must be governed by its citizens—and as
|
|||
|
vague. Even if everyone agrees on democracy, there are infinitely many
|
|||
|
possible democratic constitutions.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Proof-of-stake is not democratic, of course, because power is by wallet,
|
|||
|
not by head. The ledger belongs to its owners, in proportion to their
|
|||
|
ownership. The ledger is managed for the benefit of its owners, in
|
|||
|
proportion to their ownership of it.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The proper term for voting by wallet is plutocracy. That this is a
|
|||
|
pejorative makes it all the more delightful. But a plutocratic republic
|
|||
|
is still a republic—and faces the same general challenges in political
|
|||
|
engineering that vex any democratic republic. Here we will say democracy
|
|||
|
when we mean plutocracy. Since head-counting is impossible, there is no
|
|||
|
ambiguity; and euphemisms are nice.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Most proof-of-stake altcoin designers are not trying to innovate in
|
|||
|
political theory. But their political engineering is still
|
|||
|
awful—because it comes from the awful fashions of an awful period, in
|
|||
|
which they happen to live.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Why would they realize that following the fashionable ideas of their era
|
|||
|
would produce awful results? If everyone is using the same bad ideas,
|
|||
|
everyone’s results will be awful, and no one will notice. They will just
|
|||
|
think the problem is very hard—which it is.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Let’s look at how to take this principle, proof-of-stake, in an unusual
|
|||
|
direction. Instead of building ideal governance structures, let’s
|
|||
|
reengineer existing governance structures.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
These designs are not fashionable—since they predate the 20th century.
|
|||
|
No one would invent them now. But everyone still inhabits them. Isn’t
|
|||
|
that weird?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
If our fashionable ideals are realistic, this plan will just mean
|
|||
|
inheriting ancient cruft. If today’s ideals are not realistic, it may
|
|||
|
produce dramatically improved governance.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
From Bitcoin to Bitzion
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
To turn Bitcoin, the ledger and blockchain, into Bitzion, the digital
|
|||
|
state, we adopt the plutocratic principle of allocating authority and
|
|||
|
responsibility by stake. We declare that Bitcoin is the ledger, not the
|
|||
|
protocol or the infrastructure. We declare that the ledger is owned by
|
|||
|
the hodlers; it should be governed by the hodlers, for the hodlers; and
|
|||
|
we, the hodlers, will cultivate it into a virtual state that will
|
|||
|
astonish the world.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Although it uses proof-of-stake, Bitzion makes three large theoretical
|
|||
|
adjustments to the viewpoint of most classic altcoin-style POS
|
|||
|
governance designers. These are not technical changes; but they lead
|
|||
|
toward completely different technical challenges.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
First, most designers focus on ledger governance (algorithmic
|
|||
|
serialization); we’ll focus on systems governance (human oversight).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Second, most designers consider direct democracy the ideal form of
|
|||
|
democracy. Actually, indirect democracy creates much more effective
|
|||
|
governance structures.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Third, most designers think decentralization is the only tool for secure
|
|||
|
independence. But there is another such device: pseudonymity.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Serialization, oversight, and trust
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Serialization means recording a fair, unified, reliable and independent
|
|||
|
ordered list of transactions. Serialization is the job of every
|
|||
|
blockchain. Centralized, trusted serialization is easy. Decentralized,
|
|||
|
untrusted serialization is hard. So serialization is what most
|
|||
|
cryptosystem architects think of, when they think of governance.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Of course, humans cannot be in the serialization loop. Serialization is
|
|||
|
inherently algorithmic, if just because it has to be fast, secure and
|
|||
|
scalable, as well as fair (it does not censor or reorder transactions)
|
|||
|
and independent (no outside force can influence it).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Here is a small philosophical crack in the thinking of most
|
|||
|
cryptointellectuals. Why is Bitcoin like a state? Because it is fair,
|
|||
|
reliable, and independent. Why is it fair, reliable, and independent?
|
|||
|
Because it is decentralized. We all agree on this, but—
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
It is easy to overlook the small but important fact that what users
|
|||
|
value in Bitcoin is not its decentralization. What users value is a
|
|||
|
consequence of its decentralization: that Bitcoin is fair, reliable and
|
|||
|
independent. More broadly: that it is legitimate, effective, and
|
|||
|
sovereign. Still more broadly: that it is good at being like a state.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The Bitzion thesis is that Bitcoin has ways to become much better at
|
|||
|
being like a state. If Bitcoin is an option on statehood, this should
|
|||
|
make its price much higher. Any tactical path that produces this result
|
|||
|
must be at least worth considering.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
It is essential that we understand this difference between cause and
|
|||
|
consequence. We trust that Bitcoin is fair, reliable, and independent,
|
|||
|
because math proves that its decentralized protocol makes it so.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Or so the nerds tell us. Most of us cannot do the math—we probably
|
|||
|
don’t even know what an elliptic curve is. Byzantine what? But we trust
|
|||
|
the nerds. Trust is beautiful.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Suppose we trust that Bitcoin is fair, reliable, and independent,
|
|||
|
because it is run by the god Apollo. Apollo keeps the ledger on a big
|
|||
|
SCSI RAID rack in his basement, with a nest of ribbon cables running
|
|||
|
into a Compaq 386 PC-XT. It’s as fast as Nakamoto consensus, and even as
|
|||
|
reliable—because he’s Apollo, and Apollo is perfect.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Or so the priests of Apollo tell us, and we trust the priests. Trust is
|
|||
|
beautiful. The only relevant statement in both cases is: “we trust that
|
|||
|
Bitcoin is fair, reliable, and independent.” The cause of trust, whether
|
|||
|
decentralization or Apollo, makes no difference. What counts is the
|
|||
|
trust itself. (It’s better if the trust is rational, though.)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Besides serialization, which is governance in the proper blockchain
|
|||
|
sense, all chains have parameters; all chains have protocols; some have
|
|||
|
full operating systems. The power to update these rules, values, and
|
|||
|
systems is oversight.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Oversight is an inherently human function—though the identity and
|
|||
|
procedure of those humans may depend on the state of the ledger. Since
|
|||
|
all blockchains require some oversight, there is no choice but to trust
|
|||
|
the oversight nerds. Trust is beautiful.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
As previously mentioned, oversight in Bitcoin has historically been a
|
|||
|
shitshow. In POS altcoins, extending voting by stake from serialization
|
|||
|
to oversight is a natural idea. But that makes oversight a natural
|
|||
|
afterthought.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitzion attacks the same problem from the other end. It reasons:
|
|||
|
effective oversight can choose the best serialization algorithm. Get
|
|||
|
oversight right, and oversight will get serialization right.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Again, oversight is just government. The solution to the serialization
|
|||
|
problem is: form an effective government, and trust it to develop and
|
|||
|
manage an efficient serialization network resilient to attacks by global
|
|||
|
adversaries.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Animal control is a natural function of physical government.
|
|||
|
Serialization is a natural function of digital government. Both powers
|
|||
|
can be extremely dangerous if misused.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Malicious serialization cannot forge transactions, but it can censor and
|
|||
|
revoke them. Malicious animal control can dart and capture humans,
|
|||
|
bundle them into white vans, do some processing in an underground lab,
|
|||
|
and peddle the organs on the dark web. Don’t a lot of people just
|
|||
|
disappear? What do you think is happening to them?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
When citizens of a physical government think about how to keep bears and
|
|||
|
leopards off the street, without opening the door to rogue dogcatchers
|
|||
|
who secretly moonlight as human organleggers, they tend to focus not on
|
|||
|
this specific state function, but on delegating their consent and
|
|||
|
loyalty to a whole government which is stable and sane. Citizens of a
|
|||
|
virtual government also trust that their stable and sane government will
|
|||
|
operate a secure and efficient serialization mechanism. Again, trust is
|
|||
|
beautiful.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Since Apollo isn’t returning our calls, any serialization network will
|
|||
|
almost certainly be decentralized. The government that creates it, since
|
|||
|
it must be highly effective, is likely to be... centralized. Obviously,
|
|||
|
to any cryptointellectual, this is a huge red flag.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
By default, any central organization is a big step away from
|
|||
|
sovereignty. Independence is one of the three attributes of sovereignty.
|
|||
|
A decentralized non-organization is very hard to pressure. By default, a
|
|||
|
centralized organization is very easy to pressure—
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
By default. To apply the lesson we just learned, decentralization is not
|
|||
|
a design goal of a cryptostate. Decentralization is a mechanism. The
|
|||
|
purpose of this mechanism is independence. The purpose of independence
|
|||
|
is sovereignty—or at least, monetary sovereignty. So as engineers, we
|
|||
|
are free to use other mechanisms of independence.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
But independence, in Steve Jobs’s words, is a feature—not a product.
|
|||
|
Let’s design our new regime, then figure out how to make it independent.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Indirect democracy: magic in plain sight
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The main assumption that makes proof-of-stake governance ineffective is
|
|||
|
the almost wholly false assumption that direct democracy is better than
|
|||
|
indirect democracy.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This is a weird belief in a civilization whose realization of democracy
|
|||
|
is, and has always been, indirect. Democracies are rare in history. But
|
|||
|
direct democracies are extremely rare. Nor has the judgment of the past
|
|||
|
given them great reviews. When Athens was a direct democracy, it was the
|
|||
|
assembly who voted to execute Socrates.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
But direct democracy is more consistent with 20th-century ideology. We
|
|||
|
feel, quite reasonably, that indirect democracy is one of our many
|
|||
|
quaint legal anachronisms.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Obviously not everyone had Internet in the 1780s. They had to use
|
|||
|
dialup, or horse-drawn ballot wagons, or something. Even now, attention
|
|||
|
is in limited supply—but, at least in theory, every citizen should
|
|||
|
have the right to vote directly on every decision. Also, politics sucks
|
|||
|
and politicians suck. That’s the normal perspective.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
We love democracy and hate politics. When we realize that our new
|
|||
|
cyberstate can have democracy without politics or politicians, since it
|
|||
|
can count zillions of ballots in zilliseconds, this seems like an easy
|
|||
|
win. We don’t even think of doing it the old way, even though
|
|||
|
everything in the real world works the old way—indirect democracy.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Actually, direct democracy sucks. Virtual states will be weak and
|
|||
|
passive at best, chaotic and ineffective at worst, until they somehow
|
|||
|
reinvent indirect democracy.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A jury is not a government
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
All systems of direct democracy, including all proof-of-stake designs
|
|||
|
that I know of, use their stakeholders as a jury. A jury is a group of
|
|||
|
people who vote to ratify or reject decisions framed and proposed by
|
|||
|
some other process.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A legislature is a jury in which the members themselves have the right
|
|||
|
of proposal. All actual legislatures either delegate this power to
|
|||
|
external structures, or evolve internal structures (a cabinet in the UK,
|
|||
|
committees in the US) which are hierarchical.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Direct democracy just expands the jury to the whole electorate. While
|
|||
|
nowhere in the world, except perhaps some Swiss cantons, even pretends
|
|||
|
to be governed by direct democracy, many jurisdictions have adopted the
|
|||
|
referendum as a decorative bauble.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Digital governance can trivially borrow the referendum, and count itself
|
|||
|
democratic. A proof-of-stake blockchain can use a jury, full or
|
|||
|
sortitioned, for serialization and/or oversight. Even Bitcoin oversight
|
|||
|
only differs from POS in that the jury is the nodes.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Actually, juries suck. The jury is the most passive and reactive form of
|
|||
|
government that can be devised. It is so reactive that it is not even a
|
|||
|
complete government—it lacks any real executive arm.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Any vacuum in sovereignty will fill itself. A sovereign jury evolves its
|
|||
|
own informal leadership. When Parliament replaced the Crown as the locus
|
|||
|
of English sovereignty, to replace King and Privy Council, it evolved a
|
|||
|
Prime Minister and a Cabinet. This was not anyone’s plan, or anyone’s
|
|||
|
theory—it happened only because it had to happen.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Luckily the delegation from MPs to this pseudo-king, the PM, was
|
|||
|
well-structured. Normally, the outcome of the sovereign-jury design is
|
|||
|
an illegitimate and informal leadership agency, plus a jury which at
|
|||
|
best is a rubber stamp and at worst a zoo.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
What the jury design is best at: making large numbers of people feel
|
|||
|
important. As members of the jury, everyone can feel in charge of
|
|||
|
everything. This potent narcissistic energy is the principal marketing
|
|||
|
advantage of direct democracy—and what better moment for it to shine,
|
|||
|
than our historic golden age of narcissism?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
If a machine was designed to minimize generated power, while maximizing
|
|||
|
perceived power, it couldn’t be better designed than a gigantic jury.
|
|||
|
Let’s illustrate the difference with a design which minimizes perceived
|
|||
|
power, and maximizes generated power.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The political amplifier
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Indirect democracy is not an anachronism. The reason that indirect
|
|||
|
democracy is more common than direct democracy is that delegation is
|
|||
|
amplification. Indirect democracy generates concentrated, coherent
|
|||
|
power. Direct democracy does not.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Delegation is amplification because delegation concentrates and focuses
|
|||
|
trust—a laser for trust. A weak, coherent laser is stronger than a
|
|||
|
strong, incoherent flashlight. You can look at a 40-watt bulb. A
|
|||
|
40-milliwatt laser will rip a new asshole in your eye.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A mob, in which every participant retains freedom of action at all
|
|||
|
times, is much less effective than a much smaller army, whose soldiers
|
|||
|
delegate their freedom of action upward to one commander. The difference
|
|||
|
between a mob and an army is so strong and clear that it suggests the
|
|||
|
analogy of turbulent versus laminar flow.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In indirect democracy, citizens delegate power to politicians. Citizens
|
|||
|
cannot act directly, only by voting. There are fewer politicians than
|
|||
|
citizens; so elections must concentrate power. But voters can use power
|
|||
|
only by deciding whom to give it to.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Even in our indirect democracies, though their rational choice is
|
|||
|
between politicians, voters still think more about issues. They seem to
|
|||
|
feel they can somehow act through the politicians they elect—though
|
|||
|
there is little evidence that this works. On paper, their democracy is
|
|||
|
indirect. In their hearts, it is direct.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
So while they love democracy, they hate politics—or to be exact, they
|
|||
|
hate their enemies’ politicians, while merely disliking their own. Can
|
|||
|
we blame blockchain designers for starting from an ideal, rather than
|
|||
|
reverse-engineering this mess?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In direct democracy, where there is no delegation, every citizen can act
|
|||
|
directly on every issue. There is no need for an illusion of
|
|||
|
indirection. You actually matter. Your voice is heard. And there are no
|
|||
|
politicians.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
But you are collectively weak—because you, the people, are a mob and
|
|||
|
not an army—a bulb, not a laser. If an electorate as a whole does not
|
|||
|
matter—just because it is not strong enough to keep its dominance, or
|
|||
|
even relevance—no one’s voice matters at all.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
So the narcissistic desire for power, which is the desire to feel good
|
|||
|
and powerful, and the ethical desire for power, which is the desire to
|
|||
|
see power do good, are generally opposites. Almost always, the strongest
|
|||
|
thing to do with power is not to use it, but to give it
|
|||
|
away—concentrating it in the hands of someone who can use it more
|
|||
|
effectively.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
So when we measure the power of an indirect democracy, we measure the
|
|||
|
amount of power that citizens delegate to politicians. This is the
|
|||
|
delegation efficiency of the election. If this is 1, the politicians
|
|||
|
have the unconditional loyalty of everyone who voted. If it is 0, voters
|
|||
|
voted for random, ironic, frivolous reasons, and didn’t actually care at
|
|||
|
all. And again, delegation is amplification.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Here’s an example of how constitutional designers can adjust this knob:
|
|||
|
the length of a politician’s term. In the electronic world, terms could
|
|||
|
last any length; they could as easily be a week. When we shorten terms,
|
|||
|
does amplification decrease, or increase?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
It decreases, of course. When we elect a President every week, we the
|
|||
|
citizens are saying to the election’s winner: we trust you to serve,
|
|||
|
but just this week. We have our eyes on you! Right now, we definitely
|
|||
|
think you’re hot stuff! See you next Sunday!
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Obviously, if you have to run for President again next week, and you
|
|||
|
have no way to be sure anyone won’t change their mind about you, you
|
|||
|
are on a pretty tight leash. The shorter your chain, the weaker you
|
|||
|
are—simply because the voters who voted for you made a much smaller
|
|||
|
commitment.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
So shorter elected terms mean weaker delegation, which mean weaker
|
|||
|
amplification. Let’s go to the other extreme. We’ll elect a President
|
|||
|
not for four years, but forty. Or why not\... life?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
If we mean our votes sincerely, when electing a President for life, we
|
|||
|
are making a permanent political promise—half election, half marriage.
|
|||
|
The candidate for whom we are voting can expect our unconditional and
|
|||
|
lifelong loyalty and obedience. (Of course, our Supreme Court, for whom
|
|||
|
no one ever voted at all, is in exactly this position.)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Surely any President-for-life will be much, much more powerful than any
|
|||
|
President-for-a-week. So the delegation is stronger. So this design
|
|||
|
gives the voters themselves more power—since the more power their
|
|||
|
delegates have, the more the voters have.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
By going from an election every four years to one every forty years, we
|
|||
|
concentrate the power of ten elections into one. At this point perhaps
|
|||
|
the awful irony is almost clear. But let’s go even farther. How would a
|
|||
|
constitution generate maximum amplification? How would we design the
|
|||
|
most powerful possible election?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This election would elect not many politicians, but just one. No
|
|||
|
organization is so big it needs multiple leaders—in fact, the bigger
|
|||
|
it gets, the more important unity becomes. So the President would have
|
|||
|
unconditional control of the whole government. Crazy! Also, optimal for
|
|||
|
that attribute of sovereignty we were talking about—coherence.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
And there would be no term at all, not even life. The President would
|
|||
|
designate a successor. This would be the most powerful election
|
|||
|
ever—and, of course, the last. Until the next revolution, of course.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
So... we’ve just shown that absolute monarchy is the strongest form of
|
|||
|
democracy. An interesting result, n’est ce pas? Wily intellectuals have
|
|||
|
all seen proofs that 2+2 is actually 5. They may amuse themselves by
|
|||
|
checking the above logic once or twice.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
It is also worth noting that the constitution this election would create
|
|||
|
is merely that of the Roman Empire under the Antonine emperors—which
|
|||
|
Gibbon, 1500 years later, felt was the best government humanity had ever
|
|||
|
experienced.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Amplification versus sensitivity
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This is not a suggestion that either Bitcoin or America should adopt the
|
|||
|
constitution of the Antonines. Either could certainly do worse; both can
|
|||
|
probably do better. But we are just illustrating a theoretical tradeoff
|
|||
|
that often goes unobserved.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This is the tradeoff, in any republic, between sensitivity and
|
|||
|
amplification. Sensitivity is how accountable the leaders are downward
|
|||
|
to the will of the voters. Amplification is how much energy the voters
|
|||
|
delegate upward to the leaders.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Our one-time election maximized amplification and minimize sensitivity.
|
|||
|
Our weekly elections maximized sensitivity and minimized amplification.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
When designers opt for high sensitivity, their decision suggests a
|
|||
|
powerful fear by themselves or their customers of a failure mode in
|
|||
|
which agents betray principals. Government is a dangerous agent and must
|
|||
|
be tightly leashed.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
But when principals micromanage their agents, the leash is so tight that
|
|||
|
it chokes—and the agent cannot serve at all. You can walk a dog on a
|
|||
|
leash. You can’t hunt with a dog on a leash. The optimal leash is the
|
|||
|
leash that does not even exist, except in the unlikely case where it is
|
|||
|
actually necessary—and in that case, the leash is inexorable.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
We are the hodlers. Government is our dog—but a dog that must hunt.
|
|||
|
Fortunately, we have the technology to let a dog run free and wild as a
|
|||
|
wolf, until its owners blow a magic whistle. This recall-only republic
|
|||
|
will be low in sensitivity, high in amplification; but its sensitivity
|
|||
|
is not zero. It is not (quite) the constitution of the Antonines.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Pseudonymity versus decentralization
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitzion needs to retain Bitcoin’s independence and would ideally
|
|||
|
enhance it. How can a centralized organization achieve this?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Simple: by replacing open decentralization with closed pseudonymity.
|
|||
|
Decentralized open networks are hard to kill because they are built out
|
|||
|
of many small fish, each hard to catch. Closed pseudonymous networks can
|
|||
|
be built out of a few big fish, each almost impossible to catch.
|
|||
|
Satoshi’s identity is still a secret—so it can be done.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Again: decentralization is the means; independence is the end.
|
|||
|
Pseudonymity is trickier and more complex than decentralization. A
|
|||
|
gasoline engine is trickier and more complex than a steam engine. It has
|
|||
|
many more ways to go wrong. Sometimes the simplest answer ends up being
|
|||
|
the right answer. But you don’t drive a steam car.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Independence is inherently a security problem. In all security problems,
|
|||
|
we need to begin with a threat model.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The threat is a global adversary—a government or quasigovernmental
|
|||
|
force—which wishes to involve its will in our governance—to pressure
|
|||
|
us. Independence is boolean. Unless this pressure has absolutely no
|
|||
|
effect, our independence is compromised. History suggests that
|
|||
|
independence, once compromised, is quickly rent asunder.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The power available to this adversary is not a constant. It will tend to
|
|||
|
increase over time. It also increases as a function of the nefariousness
|
|||
|
of its prey. Therefore, one core security measure is
|
|||
|
legitimacy—maximizing compliance, both legal and social. Any future
|
|||
|
state demonstrates heaven’s mandate by complying both with its own
|
|||
|
ethical standards of tomorrow, and the bizarre whims of today’s armed
|
|||
|
clowns.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Suppose our closed pseudonymous system is a small committee—with
|
|||
|
between five and fifty members. Groups this small, if well-organized,
|
|||
|
can act with perfect cohesion. Ownership of a pseudonym is possession of
|
|||
|
a key, ideally sealed in a physical object—like one of Tolkien’s magic
|
|||
|
rings. Strong pseudonyms are synthetic—random syllable or word
|
|||
|
strings, never nicknames.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Can a global adversary find any of the keybearers—assuming all their
|
|||
|
opsec is strong, and so is their compliance? Its best bet is to trace
|
|||
|
their patterns of communication. So their best bet is to communicate as
|
|||
|
little as possible. It is quite hard to trace occasional signed
|
|||
|
statements dumped onto the Internet.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
And when keys are literally passed from hand to hand, tracing custody
|
|||
|
chains is hard, even for a global adversary. Even if the first link in
|
|||
|
the chain is a known individual, one link that refuses to break, cannot
|
|||
|
be found, has randomized the transfer, etc, sends the adversary back to
|
|||
|
looking for the physical origin of an encrypted communique.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Can pseudonymity deliver a more secure level of independence than
|
|||
|
decentralization? With a majority of mining capacity in China,
|
|||
|
decentralization is not very secure at all. What if all these keybearers
|
|||
|
were in China? Could they still communicate securely? It would be
|
|||
|
difficult—but possibly doable.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In today’s West it is certainly doable. For economic reasons, China is a
|
|||
|
great place to mine Bitcoin—Satoshi never realized that the easiest
|
|||
|
way for a state to capture Bitcoin would just be to suck in the most
|
|||
|
miners with the cheapest electricity. China is not a great place to be
|
|||
|
part of any kind of secret organization, however legit. So probably none
|
|||
|
of the keybearers would be there.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
What if the Western Internet became as well-controlled as China’s?
|
|||
|
Politically, this is not utterly implausible. Technically, it would
|
|||
|
involve Western governments being as competent as China’s. This couldn’t
|
|||
|
happen right away. There would be time to evade. And it is impossible to
|
|||
|
devise a plan so perfect that it always wins without a struggle.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitzion in a nutshell
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitzion is a design for a human government for Bitcoin. The goal of the
|
|||
|
design is to be independent, legitimate, and coherent—as befits a
|
|||
|
virtual state.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(“Zion” can be interpreted in many senses—Biblical, Israeli, Mormon,
|
|||
|
Wachowskian or, of course, Rastafarian. The analogy to the LDS may be
|
|||
|
especially apropos.)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The fundamental principle of Bitzion is that Bitcoin is the ledger.
|
|||
|
Therefore, Bitcoin is the property of its hodlers. It must be governed
|
|||
|
with their exclusive consent, and in their exclusive interest. No one
|
|||
|
else gets a vote—“no god or government.”
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Miners, nodes, developers, and even algorithms are infrastructure that
|
|||
|
serves the needs of the hodlers. Their opinions will always be
|
|||
|
interesting, relevant and valuable. They are not stakeholders in any
|
|||
|
legitimate decision process.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
All power to the hodlers! To paraphrase John Jay, a currency must be
|
|||
|
governed by those who own it. Such is the creed of Bitzionism. Until
|
|||
|
this creed is widely known and broadly agreed, Bitzion is not ready to
|
|||
|
happen.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Technically, Bitzion must begin as a fork of the Bitcoin ledger. It
|
|||
|
cannot work as designed unless it is born as the dominant
|
|||
|
fork—ideally, roughly the relationship between Ethereum and Ethereum
|
|||
|
Classic.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This requires Bitzion to achieve human reputational consensus, or
|
|||
|
something like it, before it can even launch. At best, this would be
|
|||
|
long, tough sledding! But afterward, the rest of the plan is actually
|
|||
|
quite realistic.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The hodlers declare their sovereignty. To take what is theirs, they
|
|||
|
seize the ledger. They own and will now control it. The Bitcoin ledger,
|
|||
|
once managed by a Mos Eisley of miners, nodes, developers and
|
|||
|
algorithms, will now be managed by a new human regime, whose exclusive
|
|||
|
mission is to serve the hodlers of Bitcoin.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This new regime, Bitcoin’s new government, is Bitzion—still the one
|
|||
|
and only Bitcoin. Samuel L. Jackson would like to know if you have any
|
|||
|
questions about the new regime.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
To govern Bitzion effectively as possible, the hodlers delegate their
|
|||
|
power to a board of trustees, whom they elect. These trustees inherit
|
|||
|
all the power of the old government.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
They cannot forge transactions. They do not filter transactions. They
|
|||
|
can and may do anything else—including creating any number of coins.
|
|||
|
Satoshi’s constitution is dead and overthrown. The hodlers, acting
|
|||
|
through their trustees, are now fully in the saddle.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
There are two reasons for the trustees to create coins. Regular: as a
|
|||
|
dilutive tax, to fund the normal operations of government. Special: as
|
|||
|
an assessment to fund some one-time event—which usually means cleaning
|
|||
|
up some altcoin.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Every revolution has a financial premise. The financial premise of this
|
|||
|
revolution is that one of Bitzion’s first tasks will be a dramatic
|
|||
|
reduction in mining leakage. Since Bitcoin is currently leaking about 5%
|
|||
|
of its market cap per year via mining, it seems fair to assume that
|
|||
|
grateful hodlers would be happy to approve a dilution tax up to a tenth
|
|||
|
as high: 0.5% of market cap, more comparable to an expensive gold vault.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This serious budget is wholly under the control of the trustees. But the
|
|||
|
trustees take no operational role in spending it. Instead, they delegate
|
|||
|
all their power to a single coordinator, who coordinates all the
|
|||
|
operations of Bitzion.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The trustees’ job is: hiring and firing the coordinator; reviewing the
|
|||
|
coordinator’s performance; and approving regular and special tax
|
|||
|
requests. The coordinator can request and spend regular and special
|
|||
|
taxes. The trustees do not micromanage the coordinator. The coordinator
|
|||
|
has no secrets from the trustees.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
And the hodlers still have a job. If they become unsatisfied with the
|
|||
|
performance of their government, they can recall it—electing new
|
|||
|
trustees, who will choose a new coordinator. To trigger a recall, they
|
|||
|
need a quorum defined as a percentage of the stake that voted in the
|
|||
|
previous election.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The trustees are securely pseudonymous. No one knows who they are. No
|
|||
|
one can pressure them. But given the legitimacy of Bitzion and its
|
|||
|
commitment to compliance, the coordinator’s office must be completely
|
|||
|
open, public, and transparent.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
But since the coordinator works for the trustees, the coordinator is a
|
|||
|
disposable part. All kinds of powers can pressure the coordinator. The
|
|||
|
coordinator’s job is to either perfectly resist any such pressure, or
|
|||
|
resign—but never to bend. A coordinator who bends will just get fired
|
|||
|
by the trustees, a very bad and shameful outcome.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The trustees can spin up a new coordinator in another jurisdiction, or
|
|||
|
even fall back to pseudonymous coordination. This defense works best
|
|||
|
when the coordinator sources as much labor as possible not from
|
|||
|
employees, but from pseudonymous contractors.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
So the government of Bitzion has three teams: accountability (hodlers
|
|||
|
and trustees); coordination (mahogany desk, press releases, lawyers,
|
|||
|
interviews, conferences); and production (coders, writers, designers,
|
|||
|
etc).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The accountability and production teams are pseudonymous (its members
|
|||
|
never leak their identities, even to each other); the coordination team
|
|||
|
is transparent (its staff are regular employees and have their pictures
|
|||
|
on the website).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The security of trustee identity is mission-critical. The production
|
|||
|
team can be more casual. As a labor pool, it will always experience
|
|||
|
attrition. But any producer or trustee whose identity is revealed must
|
|||
|
quit and cannot return, even under a new pseudonym.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The trustees’ job is: hiring and firing the coordinator; reviewing the
|
|||
|
coordinator’s performance; and approving regular and special tax
|
|||
|
requests. (“Tax” means dilution.) The coordinator can request and spend
|
|||
|
regular and special taxes. The trustees do not micromanage the
|
|||
|
coordinator. The coordinator has no secrets from the trustees.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
And the hodlers still have a job. If they become unsatisfied with the
|
|||
|
performance of their government, they can recall it—electing new
|
|||
|
trustees, who will choose a new coordinator. To trigger a recall, they
|
|||
|
need a quorum defined as a function of the stake that voted in the
|
|||
|
previous election. The trustees can call a new election, too.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The sophisticated observer will recognize that this version of indirect
|
|||
|
democracy, while owing little to historical Anglo-American political
|
|||
|
constitutions, is kind of a blatant ripoff of Anglo-American corporate
|
|||
|
governance.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This is unsurprising in an architecture designed to get things done. No
|
|||
|
one says our corporations aren’t sharks. Which do you want on your
|
|||
|
side—a shark, or a hippo? As an ex-CEO, the joint-stock company has an
|
|||
|
antiquated, paper-belt feel in many ways. If there was anything much
|
|||
|
more powerful, some asshole would have invented it.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Hyperdelegation
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
That’s the whole constitution, except for one little detail: how the
|
|||
|
election works. Again, Bitzion is designed to have only one election
|
|||
|
ever, unless the hodlers or the trustees get unhappy with its results
|
|||
|
and decide to press the reset button. There are a lot of ways to elect
|
|||
|
trustees, but here is a clever one.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A hyperelection is an election in which anyone can vote for anyone—so
|
|||
|
long as they’re not creating a loop. At the start, you have one election
|
|||
|
point for each coin you own. If you vote, you have zero points, and all
|
|||
|
your points, both from your own coins and from whoever votes for you,
|
|||
|
flow to whoever you vote for. The purpose of this design is to channel
|
|||
|
trust, respect and loyalty upward to the most trustworthy, respectable
|
|||
|
people.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
At the end, the N leaders become the N trustees. The trustees’ votes are
|
|||
|
weighted by the number of points they got. During the election period,
|
|||
|
the scoreboard is public, and anyone can switch their vote at any time
|
|||
|
(or this can be quantized into rounds). After the election, any trustee
|
|||
|
can resign their key to anyone else.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
As a total noob, the way you participate in a hyperelection is: (a)
|
|||
|
register your wallet; (b) figure out who you know that knows the most
|
|||
|
about Bitcoin; (c) ask that person for their pseudonym; (d) vote for
|
|||
|
them. If you want people to be able to vote for you, also register a
|
|||
|
pseudonym. If you have to, vote for a public candidate; but it’s always
|
|||
|
better to just vote for a friend.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
If you are a serious candidate, campaign. Publicize your pseudonym, with
|
|||
|
or without your real name. Speak publicly to the hodlers; speak
|
|||
|
privately with whales. During the election, if you’re not winning, vote
|
|||
|
for someone you admire who could win.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The best precedent for this kind of social gameshow mayhem is an early
|
|||
|
20th-century American political convention. In the end, most peoples’
|
|||
|
votes will end up going to one of the winners, through a path of mostly
|
|||
|
ascending respect.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Initial abnegation
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
But if the election leverages existing reputations by letting pseudonyms
|
|||
|
campaign under their real names—how pseudonymous is it? It isn’t, of
|
|||
|
course.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
We fix this problem with another rule: after choosing the first
|
|||
|
coordinator, all the initial trustees resign immediately—each giving
|
|||
|
their key to someone they know, who they think will make an even better
|
|||
|
trustee. So the first board of trustees after an election has two jobs.
|
|||
|
They select both the first coordinator, and the second board.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The result of initial abnegation is a political structure in which the
|
|||
|
second board did not choose the coordinator, so feel no attachment to
|
|||
|
that choice; the first has no lasting power, so cannot have been
|
|||
|
attracted to power; the second did not campaign, so were not selected by
|
|||
|
their craving for power or status; if the second board needs to ever use
|
|||
|
any power at all, something has already gone wrong; and the second board
|
|||
|
is securely pseudonymous, so membership cannot confer status on the
|
|||
|
humans behind it.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This structure is a shock absorber. Its goal is to dampen inappropriate
|
|||
|
energy in the governance process. This bad energy could be external
|
|||
|
pressure; it could be internal cupidity; it could even just be bad luck.
|
|||
|
From the crooked timber of humanity nothing can be made straight, but a
|
|||
|
good engineer can do a lot with geometry and redundancy.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Evaluation
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Can anything that is not a physical state ever be impervious to state
|
|||
|
pressure? Can all the devils of human cupidity ever be thoroughly
|
|||
|
banished? These are easy questions. The answers are “no” and “no.”
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
But a stronger fortress than Bitzion will be hard to build. (The main
|
|||
|
risk is probably that the hodlers go collectively crazy—a risk we have
|
|||
|
to accept when we choose low, but not zero, sensitivity.)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Although adapted to the very unusual conditions of its birth and
|
|||
|
existence, Bitzion is basically built like an early 21st-century
|
|||
|
technology company. For all their faults and the faults of their world,
|
|||
|
these can be very effective organizations—even at scale. Their
|
|||
|
devotion to their shareholders is generally not in question; and their
|
|||
|
shareholders take no actual part at all in managing them.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Let’s assume that the hodlers and trustees make good personnel choices,
|
|||
|
and create an organization as effective and aggressive as a top
|
|||
|
technology company. What will it do?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The Bitcoin space program
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitzion is Bitcoin—plus a trusted central government that has no
|
|||
|
excuse not to be as effective as any startup, if only because it is
|
|||
|
shaped like any startup.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Let’s assume that, if the coordinator can demonstrate a use for it, the
|
|||
|
trustees will grant the coordinator a dilution tax of up to 0.5% per
|
|||
|
annum. At present valuations this is \$500M, which is a serious budget:
|
|||
|
certainly enough to start a space program. Again, it is only a tenth of
|
|||
|
the present cost of Nakamoto consensus.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The mission of the coordinator is to advance the interests of the
|
|||
|
ledger—meaning the weighted interests of the hodlers. There is no
|
|||
|
other restriction on the scope or nature of Bitzion’s actions. All
|
|||
|
prudent actions designed to benefit the hodlers are authorized.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
If the hodlers needed a space program, it would be proper for the
|
|||
|
coordinator to start one. But other problems seem more pressing.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
For instance, it would not be hard to spend the budget of a space
|
|||
|
program on the full-stack Bitcoin user experience. And UX is inherently
|
|||
|
a shallow problem. Here are three of the deep architectural challenges
|
|||
|
Bitzion has to master.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Coordinated serialization
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Nakamoto consensus is a security measure. Like any security measure, its
|
|||
|
effectiveness must be evaluated relative to the threat model. Like any
|
|||
|
measure, its productivity must be evaluated relative to its price. And
|
|||
|
its price is insane.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
With Bitzion as a trusted coordinator, the threat model assumes a
|
|||
|
different shape. The Bitcoin ledger must be more trusted than the
|
|||
|
coordinator, or even the trustees. In this design, we have not one but
|
|||
|
two layers of security: government and decentralization.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The threat model of coordinated serialization is halfway between the
|
|||
|
threat model of Nakamoto consensus, and the threat model of a
|
|||
|
permissioned blockchain. It is neither completely wild, nor completely
|
|||
|
tame.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Consider the classic threat of a 51% attack—hardly an abstract danger
|
|||
|
when most mining is in China. 51% of all Bitcoin holders by position are
|
|||
|
not in China or under Chinese control, so staking is more secure against
|
|||
|
China than miner or node voting. Also, controlling miners is easier than
|
|||
|
controlling nodes; controlling nodes is easier than controlling hodlers.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Stake attacks also exist. But a governed ledger cannot be attacked in
|
|||
|
any such way. Not only can Bitzion reverse any such attacks, it can
|
|||
|
punish the attacker—by banning the staked coins from the serialization
|
|||
|
market.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitzion, like all governments, governs by combining the predictable
|
|||
|
power of law with the unpredictable power of the prerogative or
|
|||
|
exception. Judicious use of exceptional power can curate a reliable,
|
|||
|
well-distributed volunteer serialization department.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
But since the ledger must be more secure than the government, there must
|
|||
|
be a way for the ledger to keep working if the government fails or,
|
|||
|
worse, goes crazy. It makes sense to tie this safety mechanism to the
|
|||
|
hodler-initiated recall mechanism.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
While the serializers remain decentralized and uncoordinated volunteers,
|
|||
|
it is hard to imagine a dying regime convincing or coercing them to
|
|||
|
filter out a valid recall. They have no incentive to obey the regime,
|
|||
|
and every habit and incentive to obey the recall.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Any coordinated serializers constitute an attack against the regime,
|
|||
|
which the regime must repel assertively by one-strike banning. In
|
|||
|
practice, it can easily verify that most of its serializers are
|
|||
|
independent from most others. But any hint of an attempt by the regime
|
|||
|
to coordinate its own serializers cannot go undetected, nor can it
|
|||
|
succeed instantly; and it justifies an immediate recall.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
While a new government is being elected, the ledger is in “safe mode.”
|
|||
|
There is no exception. The volunteer serialization department operates
|
|||
|
as usual, but without any supervision, and with higher safety
|
|||
|
margins—which may be more expensive.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The art of solving this design problem is the art of a serialization
|
|||
|
solution which is cheap and secure, while the government is operating
|
|||
|
properly; and less cheap, but no less secure, if the government
|
|||
|
disappears, fails or turns evil. In other words: without a government,
|
|||
|
this solution must degrade into conservative proof-of-stake. This is not
|
|||
|
an easy problem, but intuitively it feels solvable.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitcoin imperialism
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
We return to the problem of altcoins and forks. The existence of
|
|||
|
parallel ledgers may not be a showstopper for Bitcoin—but it also
|
|||
|
might be a showstopper.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The goal of Bitcoin is to become a standard. A standard must be certain.
|
|||
|
Competition between coins creates uncertainty. Without these alt-dogs
|
|||
|
nipping at its heels, Bitcoin has a stronger claim to be the one. As a
|
|||
|
challenger, it needs all the strength it can get.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Standardizing digital money is just a flex. It demonstrates strength. It
|
|||
|
creates strength. All healthy and growing organizations are obsessed
|
|||
|
with their own strength. And since it must be done fairly, it it is a
|
|||
|
chance to demonstrate the grace of kings.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
So here is how Bitzion can execute a historic program of Bitcoin
|
|||
|
imperialism, crafted in the old Silicon Valley tradition of “extend and
|
|||
|
embrace” or “copy, acquire, kill.”
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Start by evaluating all the scarcity-based tokens currently trading (not
|
|||
|
“utility tokens,” which are virtual stonks, or “address space,” which is
|
|||
|
virtual real estate). Classify each as worthy or worthless. Publish this
|
|||
|
official directory and the research behind it.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A worthy altcoin is one which has made a significant contribution to the
|
|||
|
cryptosphere—in technology, traction, or both. A worthless altcoin is
|
|||
|
every other coin—or any new coin started after the official directory
|
|||
|
was published.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitzion will never recognize these worthless ledgers. It condemns them.
|
|||
|
They will go to zero, become deadcoins, and be forgotten. If you still
|
|||
|
have any after the directory appears, try to sell while there are
|
|||
|
buyers.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitzion recognizes the worthy ledgers and declares its intention to
|
|||
|
merge with them—whether they like it or not. Hopefully most will like
|
|||
|
it. The task is not easy; just doable. This makes it an excellent flex.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
First, Bitcoin will incorporate all worthy innovations of these
|
|||
|
altchains. Second, it will emulate their protocols and
|
|||
|
semantics—including a computational emulator for computational chains.
|
|||
|
Third, it will build a completely smooth migration path in which anyone
|
|||
|
working with the altchain can trivially move to the real blockchain.
|
|||
|
Most users will not even notice the difference; developers will flip a
|
|||
|
few switches.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Now the engineering work is complete, and the marriage can be
|
|||
|
consummated. Like a corporate merger, a blockchain merger is a
|
|||
|
diplomatic and financial affair. It requires (a) the consent of the
|
|||
|
altcoin holders to (b) accept some ratio of real coins per altcoin,
|
|||
|
which can be stated as a premium or discount relative to the current
|
|||
|
market ratio.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A corporation’s board can typically force its shareholders to accept a
|
|||
|
merger. None of these altchains has a board; and there are no
|
|||
|
decentralized involuntary transactions. Therefore, to merge with these
|
|||
|
anarchic collectives, Bitzion must find, assemble, and negotiate with an
|
|||
|
informal reputation pool of potential endorsers.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
These negotiations will succeed or fail—which decides whether the
|
|||
|
merger is friendly or hostile. Even a friendly merger cannot be
|
|||
|
enforced, though its chances are better. If negotiations cannot set a
|
|||
|
fair price, Bitzion will set one. Generally the hostile price is lower
|
|||
|
than the friendly price—pour encourager les autres.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Then, altcoin holders have a short period to make a decision. They can
|
|||
|
either sell their altcoins for real coins at the final ratio, or grimly
|
|||
|
hold on. If they sell, they get new but genuine coins—which the
|
|||
|
coordinator has minted with the trustees’ approval..
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In exchange, the coordinator gets all their altcoins. After the merger
|
|||
|
and migration, the coordinator sells these altcoins—using the
|
|||
|
revenues, if any, to purchase real coins.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
If even a low double-digit percentage of altcoins gets tendered, selling
|
|||
|
them blows through the altchain’s whole buy-order book like a firehose
|
|||
|
up a salmon’s asshole, and takes the market price of this legacy chain
|
|||
|
to zero, where it should stay: a deadcoin.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
So grimly holding on is kind of a bad move. Are these the tactics of
|
|||
|
Genghis Khan? Yeah, kind of. Do you know more about imperialism than
|
|||
|
Genghis Khan?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitzion starts this imperialist program on the bottom end of the worthy
|
|||
|
list—taking down its feeblest competitors first. As these involuntary
|
|||
|
mergers succeed, reducing any foolish holdouts to pyramids of 256-bit
|
|||
|
skulls, the empire’s negotiating position grows stronger and stronger.
|
|||
|
Oderint dum metuant!
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The Bitcoin intelligence agency
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The most important problem of any regime is security. For a blockchain,
|
|||
|
security is serialization plus imperialism. The second most important
|
|||
|
problem is intelligence.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This isn’t James Bond stuff, of course. Intelligence in the modern sense
|
|||
|
of the term just means collection and analysis of accurate and official
|
|||
|
information. It doesn’t require any kind of secret volcano island
|
|||
|
base—although that would certainly be cool. There are no martinis and
|
|||
|
no silencers. Yes, we do like cats.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Why do blockchains need official government intelligence? Intelligence
|
|||
|
is data plus analysis. Analysis is great—but the first thing
|
|||
|
blockchains need is data. They even have a word for an official data
|
|||
|
stream: an oracle.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The Sun has been around for four billion years. On the full power of a
|
|||
|
computational blockchain plus an official data stream, the Sun has never
|
|||
|
yet looked. In theory, it is possible to build prediction markets with
|
|||
|
oracle reputation as a second moving part. In practice these weird,
|
|||
|
wobbly markets suck.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Without this concrete and certain connection to official facts, a
|
|||
|
computational chain simply cannot think about the real world. A
|
|||
|
blockchain which can compute with facts about the real world is a
|
|||
|
different class of tool. “Prediction markets” does not cover the
|
|||
|
potential power of this architecture.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Of course, the difference between data and analysis is not always clear.
|
|||
|
Once Bitzion becomes comfortable with its right to curate official data,
|
|||
|
it will inevitably find itself considering the next step of composing
|
|||
|
official analysis.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Data feeds algorithms. Analysis feeds humans. The algorithms on a
|
|||
|
blockchain can only use data. But those algorithms are ultimately
|
|||
|
working for humans; and humans can use both data and analysis.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The mission of Bitzion is to serve the hodlers. Authoritative
|
|||
|
open-source real-world intelligence, also known as “news,” is often
|
|||
|
suspect—less the data, more the analysis. If the only narrative
|
|||
|
available to the hodlers is this “news,” and the “news” contains
|
|||
|
systematic misjudgments, the hodlers must be likely to make systematic
|
|||
|
mistakes.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
So Bitzion’s intelligence agency starts by collecting real-world
|
|||
|
facts—which helps blockchain programs think about the real world.
|
|||
|
Finding its feet with this easy work, it continues by constructing
|
|||
|
real-world narratives—which helps blockchain users think about the
|
|||
|
real world.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Again, these are exactly the nominal functions of any 21st-century
|
|||
|
intelligence agency. All these agencies still have some kind of weird
|
|||
|
1950s James Bond historical mystique. The James Bond era was real; if it
|
|||
|
even lasted into the ’50s, that would be surprising.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Today the intel agencies are mostly just government think tanks, whose
|
|||
|
wisest wisdom is not much different from the wisdom of the press and the
|
|||
|
universities. The best test of whether they matter is what would happen
|
|||
|
if they disappeared tomorrow, which is absolutely nothing.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Yet their nominal function—research and analysis—remains real and
|
|||
|
relevant. Nothing, moreover, could be more legitimate. This proposed
|
|||
|
Bitcoin intelligence agency is, in the words of our peach-haired
|
|||
|
President, “very legal and very cool.”
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Of course, Bitzion keeps no secrets. All this intelligence product is
|
|||
|
public. And like the rest of Bitzion, it is independent of real-world
|
|||
|
power.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Needless to say, raw input from “the news” or even “science,” even from
|
|||
|
the most “reliable” or “respected” sources, is never incorporated
|
|||
|
directly and without a clear positive argument into the output of the
|
|||
|
analysis directorate.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Rather, its mission is to understand the world anew from scratch.
|
|||
|
Everything “known” is an invaluable resource, of course. But just a
|
|||
|
resource. How do we “know” this? Imagine trying to recreate Wikipedia
|
|||
|
with no “reliable” sources—but instead, the conviction that all
|
|||
|
information from the 20th century is unreliable until shown otherwise.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
So is all external information. While an intelligence agency wants to
|
|||
|
hear everything, its mission is to think entirely for itself. Nothing in
|
|||
|
its raw input stream is true until the agency has some clear positive
|
|||
|
reason to consider it true. “Always trust content from Microsoft
|
|||
|
Corporation” is not a valid form of reason.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This question need not be asked story by story or paper by paper. It is
|
|||
|
best asked field by field, department by department, agency by agency.
|
|||
|
If the old 20th-century truth is a blueberry pie, we can pick out the
|
|||
|
moldy parts slice by slice, not berry by berry. The whole pie is never
|
|||
|
moldy—however old, there are always good parts in a pie. Pure math,
|
|||
|
for instance, remains sweet and delicious with only a very mild
|
|||
|
fermented bite. Then again, pure math did pretty well in the USSR.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
At this point we imagine a genuine conflict between virtual and physical
|
|||
|
power—but this is probably a good stopping point for today. Once
|
|||
|
Bitcoin has gone so far toward making a nation that it has made an
|
|||
|
intelligence agency, the point seems proven.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Both necessary and impossible
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Of course, the CJNG must feel the same way about its little panzer
|
|||
|
parade— and that actually happened.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Anyone who has actually read all this perhaps feels the same intuitive
|
|||
|
sense as me: that Bitzion theoretically should happen, but actually
|
|||
|
can’t happen. It is both necessary, and impossible; both fantastic, and
|
|||
|
pragmatic.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
I have put a lot of words into why Bitzion is necessary. I already
|
|||
|
warned you that it is impossible. If it becomes possible, it will not
|
|||
|
become possible easily.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Our theoretical interest, as political engineers, in what should be
|
|||
|
done, remains legitimate. But a thought-experiment and a practical
|
|||
|
conspiracy are two things. The conversation is not over without talking
|
|||
|
about why it cannot happen. So let’s do that.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
It’s simple. Bitzion cannot happen because vanity is poison and everyone
|
|||
|
is poisoned.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Recently, Marc Andreessen wrote a much-cited essay which asked everyone
|
|||
|
to build. Everyone should build. Not everyone should be an architect.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The trouble with asking the whole world to build is that this world is
|
|||
|
so poisoned by vanity that it can only hear one message: be an
|
|||
|
architect. Almost all these people should be learning to put one brick
|
|||
|
on top of another. But once a thousand architects have argued about how
|
|||
|
to build the house, there is often not a bricklayer to be found.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Having done both—metaphorically speaking—I will tell you
|
|||
|
straight-up: it is more honorable to be a bricklayer. Architecture is a
|
|||
|
gift. Masonry is a craft. Never trust anyone who has a gift but no
|
|||
|
craft. If you have a gift, pursue your craft. Only fate can make you an
|
|||
|
architect; but fate seems to like a man who can lay a brick.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
To lay a brick is to pursue the path laid down for you; it is to follow.
|
|||
|
The mason is not an artist but an artisan. For an artist, the definition
|
|||
|
of perfect is broad; for an artisan, it is narrow. The same amount of
|
|||
|
effort and achievement can go into either.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Yet the architect, who is an artist, leads; the mason, who is an
|
|||
|
artisan, follows. The wall needs to go where it is supposed to go. It
|
|||
|
needs to look like what it is supposed to look like. Yet in the hands of
|
|||
|
an ordinary mason, it will be okay; in the hands of a fine mason, it
|
|||
|
will be striking; anyone can tell the difference and no one can say
|
|||
|
quite why.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
While the society that forces an artist to be an artisan has failed, so
|
|||
|
has the society that forces an artisan to be an artist—or that exalt
|
|||
|
the artist above the artisan. The latter is simply a society without
|
|||
|
artisans—which is a society that cannot build. Oops.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(In fact it is a curse to be a real artist or scientist. These people
|
|||
|
should be derided and shunned. It’s an admission against interest—but
|
|||
|
that way, they’ll do their best work.)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This is where Bitzion fails. Bitzion is obvious. Bitzion would already
|
|||
|
have happened— in a world where people thought about collective action
|
|||
|
not in terms of leading, but in terms of joining and following—where
|
|||
|
they knew how to be masons, not architects.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Not that anyone knows how to be an architect, either. Being an architect
|
|||
|
means making plans which masons follow. There are no masons; so there
|
|||
|
are no architects. No one has any experience in the actual profession of
|
|||
|
architecture. There are just dreamers who try to build beautiful dreams,
|
|||
|
by themselves, sloppily. Many houses are started; few are finished; many
|
|||
|
of these fall down. But the rest are beautiful.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This metaphor is just a metaphor. It could describe many careers and
|
|||
|
professions. In all such cases, there is one factor in common: vanity is
|
|||
|
poison.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In the case of Bitzion, vanity manifests itself as an inability to
|
|||
|
trust. To the average hodler, the thought of delegating collective
|
|||
|
control to the board of trustees—even through this clever mechanism,
|
|||
|
by which no one’s vote is lost—is horrifying.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Even the thought of trusting the hodlerate collectively would horrify
|
|||
|
most hodlers. Literal collectivism? Why, isn’t Bitcoin supposed to be
|
|||
|
the exact opposite of that?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
But worst of all—hyperdelegation, or any sort of delegation, or
|
|||
|
election, or indirect democracy in general, means you are giving away
|
|||
|
your power. Why vote, when you could rule? It’s going from weed to
|
|||
|
meth—having ruled, it will never be enough to just vote.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
For example, when you vote, you vote every four years—for four years,
|
|||
|
except one day, you have zero power. When you rule, you get to rule
|
|||
|
every day of the week. And even worse: when you vote, you follow. You
|
|||
|
literally submit to another person. You almost feel your genitals
|
|||
|
shrinking.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
To be a mason is to say to some other human or humans: I will obey you,
|
|||
|
I will follow your directions, I will put the bricks how and where you
|
|||
|
tell me to put them, I will not create my own whimsical Art Nouveau
|
|||
|
motifs.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Of course, to join together and follow a common leader, or leadership,
|
|||
|
or government, or constitution, is the fundamental act which creates all
|
|||
|
regimes. This act is necessary. Without such an act of common consent,
|
|||
|
no political structure can be created.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
But one and only one word of this recipe is utterly impossible. That
|
|||
|
word is follow. No one wants to follow. Worse: no one even knows how to
|
|||
|
follow.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The practical consequence of this deficit is an inability to trust. The
|
|||
|
project of Bitzion is impossible because it depends on taking a hodler
|
|||
|
community dedicated, X-Files style, to trusting no one; and moving it to
|
|||
|
trusting each other; and implementing this by trusting a roomful of
|
|||
|
people, who then trust a single person.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
To a true Bitcoiner, this seems completely insane. It is also how every
|
|||
|
company in the world, major or minor, works—and Bitcoin has the market
|
|||
|
cap of a major company. And in any major company, the amount of time the
|
|||
|
shareholders spend even caring about the governance of the company, let
|
|||
|
alone trying to change it, is epsilon.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
If they are not delegating unconditional trust, they are delegating
|
|||
|
something close. They have no plan at all for running the company
|
|||
|
themselves, or even interceding in its decision loop. There are always
|
|||
|
exceptions; but this is the normal operating loop. The shareholders seem
|
|||
|
to trust their direct representatives, the directors, no less than they
|
|||
|
trust the CEO selected by those directors. This is an amazing amount of
|
|||
|
trust—which can only exist because the joint-stock company was
|
|||
|
invented long ago.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Everything big that works is worked by these companies. They are clearly
|
|||
|
the most effective way to operate at scale. Yet we are incapable of
|
|||
|
recreating this level of trust in a new context. The joint-stock company
|
|||
|
design survives because it is grandfathered—and because it works so
|
|||
|
well. Nonetheless, a “capitalist” government is no more than one which
|
|||
|
allows joint-stock companies—so there remains a huge target on its
|
|||
|
back.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
And yet, the idea of the hodlers of Bitcoin collectively agreeing to
|
|||
|
turn themselves into the sharehodlers of Bitzion, which is the same as
|
|||
|
Bitcoin except that it governs itself rather than being governed by
|
|||
|
math, seems at a certain level preposterous—because it goes from
|
|||
|
trusting math, to trusting humans. And trusting humans is following. And
|
|||
|
following is servitude—which was exactly what we were trying to escape
|
|||
|
from, right?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In practice Bitcoiners have to trust humans anyway; only a government
|
|||
|
which is both legitimate and human can be proactive, which means only
|
|||
|
such a government can be effective; and government by hash is incredibly
|
|||
|
expensive. And yet Bitcoin remains the leader—proving the power of
|
|||
|
monetary incumbency.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitcoin can’t do a 180 and treat decentralization not as an end, but as
|
|||
|
a means—to the real goal, independence. This would open the door to
|
|||
|
independence through a wholly different means, pseudonymous
|
|||
|
centralization. It seems like a minor, obvious change. But it would
|
|||
|
require Bitcoin to entirely change its mind—or at least, its religion.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Bitcoin is a cult, for better or worse. Cults don’t change their
|
|||
|
collective minds from the bottom up. Bitcoin is a cult with an
|
|||
|
accidental and mathematical government. Bitzion is the exact same cult,
|
|||
|
with an conscious and human government.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
An altcoin or a fork with this design could still be organized; but it
|
|||
|
would still be an altcoin. Please don’t try this. Bitzion has to be all
|
|||
|
of Bitcoin, or most of it; and if didn’t ask you to follow, it might
|
|||
|
have a chance at that. But it exists to ask you to follow.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Honor still demands honesty. In a society where everyone is too good to
|
|||
|
lay bricks, no one can build a house. It’s a hard problem, and it won’t
|
|||
|
get solved here. But solving the problem has to start by talking about
|
|||
|
it.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Consider the irony. This ancient human talent—the reflex for
|
|||
|
unconditional loyalty—which could make Bitcoin a thousand times more
|
|||
|
powerful—is, for a bunch of peasant narco-soldiers from Jalisco, as
|
|||
|
easy as falling off a log.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Yet you might as well ask the hodlers, our fellow autistic rationalist
|
|||
|
superbrains, who whether they like it or not are citizens of this new
|
|||
|
thing with a B, to dunk a basketball. Our 20th-century prejudice is that
|
|||
|
intelligence is power. Sometimes it is weakness; and all we have to
|
|||
|
fight this weakness is intelligence itself.
|