hidden and unexplained central authority, whom you have to trust, and
which does stuff that is never explained or revealed. This is not stable, and
does not scale. Not only is it evil, it is incapable of connecting everyone
in the world to everyone in the world. The existing lightning network has the
same problem as Tether.
Tether is not a ponzi scheme. It is an unregulated bank, but it is still doing
marginal reserve banking, and will implode sooner or later due to insider
fraud or maturity transformation, and something analogous is bound to
happen with the existing Bitcoin lightning network, because of the inherent
fragility of centralization. The moral problem of the existing lightning
network is the same as the moral problem of marginal reserve
correspondence banking. Scaling requires trustlessness. Or rather you are
trusting that if enough people see and process the transactions in full, then,
because they are not parties to that transaction and don’t have a dog in the
fight, they will process it correctly. And as soon as you have a central
authority that you have to trust, you have a party with an interest and
capability to not process it correctly.
So we don’t want everyone in the world, or even every full peer in the
world, to process every transaction in the world. We want every full peer
in the world to process every transaction in the world where the parties
quarrel, with most other transactions never showing up directly on the
primary blockchain. And we don’t want everyone in the world to be a full
peer. We want enough full peers that the vast majority will not have a dog
in the fight, and we want anyone in the world who is reasonably affluent
and wants to be a full peer to be able to be a full peer, which is likely to be
most with substantial amounts of cryptocurrency. At scale, nearly
everyone will keep his money in his client wallet, but if it is a lot of
money, his client wallet will likely be a client of a peer that he controls.
# The failures of bitcoin
The pseudonymity of coins being owned by the bearer of some
cryptographic key is a failure; People have been eavesdropping and
aggressively analyzing the block chain from day 1. And the block chain
will always be there, it will always be public, and it will always be subject
to further analysis. And we are learning that analysis of that record is
sufficient to destroy any pretense of anonymity or pseudonymity.
The scarcity of transactions has led people to re-invent every last feature
of the banks they thought they were going to be escaping. Including debt
brokering (lightning network) and fractional-reserve banking, starting with
the case of Mt. Gox and continuing to ventures today by “responsible”
business people who just don’t get, or don’t care, or both, that the entire
reason the system existed, as far as the early adopters were concerned, was
to get away from exactly that. They have made Bitcoin into a debt-based
system like any other; as long as the “exchange” holds your keys for you,
there is no obligation for them to maintain assets equal to the deposits. You
can’t prove that they are, or aren’t, maintaining sufficient assets until
after those assets are spent and the evidence appears in the block chain.
And it’s useless for small transactions. Had it been deployed to a
market the size of, say, a college campus it could bear the load and
the bidding for block space wouldn’t exceed the value of most
transactions. But had it been deployed to a market the size of a
college campus, the small pool of miners available would make mining
bursty and unstable, and the block chain therefore not well protected
from tampering. Same could have happened to Bitcoin early on, which is
why Satoshi was mining like crazy and jumping on when needed to prop up
the block rate and back off again when the blocks were coming too fast.
And that brings us to mining. Bitcoin mining has encouraged corruption
(Because it’s often done using electricity which is effectively stolen
from taxpayers with the help of government officials), wasted enormous
resources of energy, fostered botnets, centralized mining activity in a
country where centralization means it’s effectively owned by exactly
the kind of government most people thought they *DIDN’T* want looking
up their butts and where the people who that government allows to “own”
this whole business work together as a cartel.
The whole idea of proof-of-work mining is broken the instant hardware
comes out which is specialized for mining and useless for general
computation because at that point the need to have compute power
for other purposes is absolutely irrelevant in having any effect on mining,
and there ceases to be any force that causes mining to be distributed
around the world. It becomes a “race to the bottom” to find where people
can get the cheapest electricity, and then mining anywhere else – anywhere
the government tries to make sure ordinary people actually get the benefit
from electricity bought for tax money, for example – becomes first pointless,
then a net loss.
Bitcoin doesn’t scale, except by becoming the very thing it was supposed to
replace.
Bitcoin was a Pilot system, a good first effort. It did what a Pilot system is
intended to do: show where the pitfalls lie.
You're supposed to learn from it, then toss it out and go back to the
drawing board.
We cannot keep pushing the prototype, we must a designing a proper production system.
Satoshi’s main goal was to improve on DigiCash, RPOW and other similar schemes
that had a fair degree of decentralization but still relied on a central authority. Satoshi managed to solve this problem in a genius way
by combing existing technologies and understanding of human psychology.
People had been trying to solve it for decades without any luck. People like
Wei Dai and Szabo came close but never managed to materialize their visions
(assuming they're not Satoshi).
Bitcoin showed us where the pitfalls are, so we can focus attention on solving
them.
Privacy, security, efficiency, and scalability are mutually opposed if if one attempts to have them all on the blockchain. For the blockchain achieves security by everyone repeating the processing of everyone else’s transactions, which is opposed to privacy, efficiency, and scalability.
The most efficient way is obviously a single central authority deciding everything, which is not very private nor secure, and has big problems with scalability.
If a transaction is to be processed by many people, one achieves privacy, as with Monaro, by cryptographically padding it with a lot of misinformation, which is contrary to efficiency and scalability.
The efficient and scalable way to do privacy is not to share the
information at all. Rather we should arrange matters so that
information only goes to the blockchain to be scrutinized by
many people if the parties to the transaction have a falling out.
Which is what the Bitcoin lightning network was supposed to be,
but is not.
Bitcoin’s pseudonymity is alarmingly weak, (though the Wasabi wallet
partially fixes this). The lightning network layer would fix this, as
well as providing instant transactions, but a true lightning network
cannot be implemented over Bitcoin as it exists today.
A lightning network would provide instantly settled transactions and
strong fungibility. It would make bitcoins (unspent transaction outputs of
the blockchain) far less traceable, because lightning transactions happen
off chain and inherently mingle coins, thus making crypto coins fully
fungible, thus increasing their desirability as a direct substitute for cash.
# proof of stake, Byzantine fault, and statehood
A proof of stake currency is a corporation. Its currency is shares in that
corporation. Corporations derive their corporateness from the authority
of the sovereign, but a proof of stake currency derives its corporateness from
each stakeholder (shareholder) playing by the rules because all the other
stakeholders play by those rules.
Which means the rules to be incentive compatible and have provide
Byzantine Fault Resistant consensus.
This was Satoshi’s great stroke of genius. If most people follow Satoshi’s rules, everyone has an economic incentive to follow the rules.
Constructing such a set of rules is very hard. Even non Byzantine
distributed consensus is hard, because distributed consensus is very hard.
The Byzantine Generals problem is named after Byzantium, because in the
latter days of the Byzantine empire, there were some generals who wanted
a large part of the Byzantine army defeated and annihilated so that they
could take Byzantium, overthrow the emperor, and become emperor.
So general Malloc might send general Bob the the message:
> facing overwhelming enemy attack, falling back. You and general Dave may soon be cut off.