wallet/docs/manifesto/sox_accounting.md

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title: >-
    Sox Accounting
...
Accounting and bookkeeping is failing in an increasingly low trust world
of ever less trusting and ever less trustworthy elites, and Sarbanes-Oxley
accounting (Sox) is an evil product of this evil failure.

Enron was a ponzi scam that pretended to be in the business of buying and
selling.  They would sell stuff cheap for cash on the barrelhead, then buy it
dear on credit, and have the seller deliver the stuff to the buyer, without
themselves ever going near the stuff, or knowing anything about the stuff.

And, as ponzi scams tend to do, need to do, they grew and grew and grew,
resulting many excited investors buying Enron shares.

And some people wondered, “where are these mighty profits coming from?  How
can you create value without ever getting anywhere near anything that actually
has value?”.  To which Enron replied “financial wizardry”, which was, in a
sense, true.

But Enron kept books.

Enron hired the very best and most respectable accountants to go over its
books with the greatest of thoroughness, and paid them very well indeed
to do so.

The very respectable accountants turned somersaults to avoid seeing evil.

Some suspicious investors hired a bunch of accounting students, who were
not employed by a respectable accounting firm, nor subject to any
respectable authority of respectable accountants properly established in the
respectable accounting profession, to go over Enron’s books with a fine
tooth comb.

It quickly became obvious to these disreputable accounting students that
Enron was a ponzi scheme, that the books were the books of ponzi
scheme, that the books were true though misleading, and truly reported a
ponzi scheme losing money hand over fist.

The investors made the results of this examination of Enron’s books
public.

When the whole thing blew up, a great many discussions came to light
which amounted to Enron asking the very respectable accountants how to
help the very respectable accountants refrain from seeing what they were
seeing, the very respectable accountants asking each other and other very
respectable accountants how to not see what they were seeing, and the
very respectable accountants then telling Enron how protect the very
respectable accountants from seeing what they were seeing.

And suddenly people stopped being willing to pay Enron cash on the
barrelhead for goods, suddenly stopped being willing to sell Enron goods
on credit.  Suddenly Enron could no longer pay its employees, nor its
landlord.  Its employees stopped turning up, its landlord chucked their
furniture out into the street.

Problem solved.

If only it had stayed solved, but much bigger trouble was in store.

Suddenly people started not respecting very respectable accountants.
Suddenly people started not trusting books kept by very respectable
accountants for very respectable businesses.

The accountants rushed to the government, and said “Accounting is
collapsing.  Business is in chaos.  You must *force* people to respect us.  (And
also regulate the hell out of us to ~~make our crimes legal~~ ensure that none
of us commit these crimes again)”

Investors who had purchased Enron’s shares, and sellers who had sold Enron
stuff on credit, rushed to the government and said “Accountants are
untrustworthy, businesses are untrustworthy.  We have a crisis of trust.  You
must regulate the hell out of them to *force* them to be trustworthy.”

Of course you cannot force people to be trustworthy.  You can, however force
people to act as if they trusted people that they do not in fact trust.
Which prevents people from freely associating with trustworthy people
and from refusing to associate with untrustworthy people, the crisis being
in large part that people were disinclined to associate with very respectable
accountants, and were instead inclined to associate with the thoroughly
disreputable accounting students and the investors who had hired them.

So there was in practice a great deal of overlap between very respectable
accountants asking government to force business to use their services and
naïve idiots asking government to force business and accountants to
behave in a more trustworthy manner.

And so, we got a huge bundle of accounting regulation, Sarbanes-Oxley.

Sox required publicly traded companies to keep their books in accordance
with certain rules, and has in fact successfully prevented any publicly
traded companies from doing an Enron in the exact same way that Enron
did it, though what MF Global did was not hugely different.

But it directly contributed the Great Minority Mortgage Meltdown.  The
purpose of book keeping is to track the movement and creation of value.
Accounting is the art and science of making sense out of the books, and
making sure the books make sense.  In the aftermath of the Great Minority
Mortgage Meltdown, a whole lot of entities went belly up, and when the
creditors went through the books, they found all the mortgages the entities
supposedly owned, but were frequently unable to find the physical people
supposedly responsible for paying these mortgages,
and were sometimes unable to find the physical properties that
were supposedly security for these mortgages.

Sox books just tend to not track value very well, because they
just don't track physical reality, being designed for a
different, more complex, and difficult to define, task.  Sox books tend to
track official reality and disregard the reality of the ground beneath your
feet, the things in your hands, and what is before your eyes, with the result
that they tend to track the creation of holiness and ritual purity, rather than
the creation of value.

From the seventeenth century to the nineteenth, bookkeeping was explicitly Christian.
The immutable append only journal reflected God's creation, the balance of the books
was an earthly reflection of the divine scales of justice and the symmetry of God’s creation.
When the dust settled over the Great Minority Mortgage Meltdown it became apparent that
the books of the financial entities involved had little connection to God's creation.

But the biggest problem with Sarbanes-Oxley is not that it has failed to
force publicly traded companies and their accountants to act in
a trustworthy manner, but that it has forced them to act in an untrustworthy
manner.

It is not only very difficult and enormously expensive to comply with Sox.
It is also *impossible* to comply with Sox.  What publicly traded companies
do instead is hire an accounting firm so well connected to the regulators
that when it blesses the books it has prepared as Sox compliant, the
regulators will pretend to believe.  Which is great for the very respectable
accountants, who get paid a great deal of money, and great for the
regulators, who get paid off, but is terrible for businesses who pay a great
deal of money and do  not in fact get books that accurately tell
management how the business is doing, and considerably worse for
startups trying to go public, since the potential investors know that the
books do not accurately tell the investors how the business is doing.

What established businesses do instead is prepare one set of books for
Sox compliance, and another illegal and forbidden 
set of books for management that do not comply
with Sox but which actually do reflect the movement and creation of
value, but a startup is not allowed to tell potential investors about the
real books that actually reflect the movement and creation of value for the
purpose of an IPO.

Which has killed off startups and IPOs, which used to be my bread and
butter.

To do a startup again, we are going to have to do it on a blockdag.

(Blockdags being the latest advance in blockchains, an unbalanced Merkle
dag instead of an unblanced Merkle tree.)