Merge pull request #561 from libexpat/namesep-security
[CVE-2022-25236] lib: Protect against insertion of namesep characters into namespace URIs
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@ -2,6 +2,22 @@ NOTE: We are looking for help with a few things:
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https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/labels/help%20wanted
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If you can help, please get in touch. Thanks!
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Release X.X.X XXX XXXXXXX XX XXXX
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Security fixes:
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#561 CVE-2022-25236 -- Passing (one or more) namespace separator
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characters in "xmlns[:prefix]" attribute values
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made Expat send malformed tag names to the XML
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processor on top of Expat which can cause
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arbitrary damage (e.g. code execution) depending
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on such unexpectable cases are handled inside the XML
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processor; validation was not their job but Expat's.
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Exploits with code execution are known to exist.
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Special thanks to:
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Ivan Fratric
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and
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Google Project Zero
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Release 2.4.4 Sun January 30 2022
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Security fixes:
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#550 CVE-2022-23852 -- Fix signed integer overflow
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@ -718,8 +718,7 @@ XML_ParserCreate(const XML_Char *encodingName) {
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XML_Parser XMLCALL
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XML_ParserCreateNS(const XML_Char *encodingName, XML_Char nsSep) {
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XML_Char tmp[2];
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*tmp = nsSep;
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XML_Char tmp[2] = {nsSep, 0};
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return XML_ParserCreate_MM(encodingName, NULL, tmp);
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}
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@ -1344,8 +1343,7 @@ XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate(XML_Parser oldParser, const XML_Char *context,
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would be otherwise.
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*/
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if (parser->m_ns) {
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XML_Char tmp[2];
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*tmp = parser->m_namespaceSeparator;
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XML_Char tmp[2] = {parser->m_namespaceSeparator, 0};
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parser = parserCreate(encodingName, &parser->m_mem, tmp, newDtd);
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} else {
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parser = parserCreate(encodingName, &parser->m_mem, NULL, newDtd);
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@ -3761,6 +3759,17 @@ addBinding(XML_Parser parser, PREFIX *prefix, const ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId,
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if (! mustBeXML && isXMLNS
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&& (len > xmlnsLen || uri[len] != xmlnsNamespace[len]))
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isXMLNS = XML_FALSE;
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// NOTE: While Expat does not validate namespace URIs against RFC 3986,
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// we have to at least make sure that the XML processor on top of
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// Expat (that is splitting tag names by namespace separator into
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// 2- or 3-tuples (uri-local or uri-local-prefix)) cannot be confused
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// by an attacker putting additional namespace separator characters
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// into namespace declarations. That would be ambiguous and not to
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// be expected.
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if (parser->m_ns && (uri[len] == parser->m_namespaceSeparator)) {
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return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX;
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}
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}
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isXML = isXML && len == xmlLen;
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isXMLNS = isXMLNS && len == xmlnsLen;
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@ -7220,6 +7220,35 @@ START_TEST(test_ns_double_colon_doctype) {
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}
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END_TEST
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START_TEST(test_ns_separator_in_uri) {
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struct test_case {
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enum XML_Status expectedStatus;
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const char *doc;
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};
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struct test_case cases[] = {
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{XML_STATUS_OK, "<doc xmlns='one_two' />"},
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{XML_STATUS_ERROR, "<doc xmlns='one
two' />"},
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};
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size_t i = 0;
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size_t failCount = 0;
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for (; i < sizeof(cases) / sizeof(cases[0]); i++) {
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XML_Parser parser = XML_ParserCreateNS(NULL, '\n');
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XML_SetElementHandler(parser, dummy_start_element, dummy_end_element);
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if (XML_Parse(parser, cases[i].doc, (int)strlen(cases[i].doc),
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/*isFinal*/ XML_TRUE)
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!= cases[i].expectedStatus) {
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failCount++;
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}
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XML_ParserFree(parser);
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}
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if (failCount) {
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fail("Namespace separator handling is broken");
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}
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}
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END_TEST
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/* Control variable; the number of times duff_allocator() will successfully
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* allocate */
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#define ALLOC_ALWAYS_SUCCEED (-1)
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@ -11905,6 +11934,7 @@ make_suite(void) {
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tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_utf16_doctype);
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tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_invalid_doctype);
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tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_double_colon_doctype);
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tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_separator_in_uri);
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suite_add_tcase(s, tc_misc);
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tcase_add_checked_fixture(tc_misc, NULL, basic_teardown);
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